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 ABSTRACT 
Given the importance of monetary policy in the operation of a successful modern economy and 
the use of official
2
 interest rates as tools in its implementation, this study investigates the 
implications of changing bank concentration on the operation of the Interest Rate Pass Through 
(IRPT) of official rates to bank lending and deposit rates. This is an issue made more poignant by 
growing mergers, acquisitions and bank consolidation exercises around the world that have 
brought interest to their implications for economic performance. However, with contention high 
in the industrial organisation theory on the likely relationship between bank concentration and 
the IRPT, and the outcomes of empirical investigations producing conflicting evidence, the 
desire to investigate the issue in the African context necessitated a thorough empirical 
investigation of four African countries (South Africa, Botswana, Nigeria and Zambia).   
This study not only extended the investigation of the issue to the African context, but it merged 
different IRPT measurement techniques that had not been jointly applied to this particular issue, 
namely; Symmetric and Asymmetric Error Correction Models, Mean Adjustment Lags, Ordinary 
Least Squares estimations and Autoregressive Distributed Lag models. These measures of the 
IRPT were compared with three firm concentration ratios on two different levels of analysis, one, 
over the entire period and, another, through eight year rolling windows. 
The results reveal that bank concentration can sometimes be related to the speed and magnitude 
of the IRPT but that these relationships are not consistent amongst the countries, over the entire 
sample period or across the two levels of analysis, suggesting reasons why empirical results have 
arrived at contrasting conclusions. The results revealed more evidence of a relationship between 
bank concentration and the magnitude of the IRPT than between bank concentration and the 
speed of the IRPT. Furthermore, where relationships were identified there was evidence 
supporting both the structure conduct performance hypothesis and the competing efficient 
market hypothesis as the true representation of the relationship between bank concentration and 
the IRPT. The key implication of the result for African countries is that increased bank 
concentration through bank consolidation programmes should not be automatically regarded as 
detrimental to the effective implementation of monetary policy through the IRPT. Consequently, 
                                                            
2 The word “official” will be used interchangeably with the word “policy” when describing the interest rates set by 
monetary policy authorities. 
3
 banking sector regulation need not stifle bank consolidation and growth to preserve monetary 
policy effectiveness. Rather, since the relationship cannot be neatly represented by a single 
theory or hypothesis each country must determine its own interaction between bank 
concentration and its IRPT before policies regarding the banking sector concentration and 
effective monetary policy, through the use of official interest rates, are determined.  
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 CHAPTER 1 
 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 BACKGROUND, CONTEXT AND RATIONALE FOR THE RESEARCH 
While there has generally been consensus on the importance of effective monetary policy, debate 
on the most appropriate means to achieve it has created long standing issues in the literature of 
Monetary Economics and Central Banking (Rasche and Williams, 2005). According to Mishkin 
(1995), monetary policy is only effective if its tools are able to quickly transmit monetary 
impulses to interest rates and if the resultant new structure of interest rates affects real 
expenditure. This understanding of monetary policy implementation divides the operation of 
monetary policy into two stages. The first is the transmission of the desired monetary policy 
impulses to interest rates and the second is the translation of those impulses into changes in real 
expenditure. It is this important first stage of interest rate transmission from policy dictated rates 
to interbank and retail rates that is known as the interest rate pass through (IRPT). As a key 
conduit for monetary policy that relays the policy stance to the economy, the IRPT makes 
official interest rates effective by allowing them to be reflected in bank lending and deposit 
rates
3
.  
The task for monetary authorities and the focus of wide research has been on understanding the 
IRPT and ensuring that it remains strong
4
. Failing this, policy rates are weakened as effective 
tools for monetary policy. With this in mind, effective monetary policy analysis has now not 
only concerned itself with measuring the IRPT but with determining the catalysts for and 
impediments to a smooth IRPT. 
It is at the point of impediments that early work by Hannan and Berger (1991), Neumark and 
Sharpe (1992), and Cottarelli and Kourellis (1994) suggested a look at bank market structure to 
explain differences in the IRPT amongst banks within a country and comparatively between 
banks in different countries. By merging industrial organisation theory and the IRPT they 
                                                            
3 This IRPT is effectively the crucial first step of Mishkin’s (1995) Monetary Transmission Mechanism. 
4 A strong/smooth IRPT refers to a pass through process in which official rates are fully and quickly reflected in 
bank lending and deposit rates. This makes IRPT analysis synonymous with the measurement of its speed and 
magnitude. 
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 suggested the analysis of the banking industry as a key determinant in the effectiveness of 
monetary policy because of the role it could play in the strength of the IRPT.  
Amongst the characteristics of the bank market structure that they investigated was the impact of 
bank concentration. Bank concentration is particularly interesting because different industrial 
organisation theories, and the interpretation of those theories, provide ambiguous implications 
for the relationship between changing bank concentration and the conduct of banks and, 
ultimately, the IRPT.  
Bain’s (1956 in Hannan and Berger, 1991) structure-conduct-performance hypothesis suggests a 
clear positive relationship between market concentration and a weak IRPT based on the expected 
behaviour of market participants in highly concentrated markets. This is because highly 
concentrated markets provide opportunities for collusive behaviour that allows banks to carry 
lending and deposit rates that do not necessarily reflect the desired stance of monetary policy 
authorities. In contrast, the efficient structure hypothesis suggests that the IRPT would strengthen 
as the market became concentrated and the inefficient banks were removed from the market. 
This would be the case where banks that may have tried to artificially maintain bank rates that 
did not reflect prevailing official rates were forced out of the market. Empirically, in the work of 
Hannan and Berger (1991), Neumark and Sharpe (1992) and Scholnick (1996) banking sector 
concentration influences bank conduct and consequently the nature of the IRPT. Conversely, in 
the studies conducted by Cottarelli and Kourellis (1994), Berstein and Fuentes (2003) and 
Abbasoglu et al. (2005) banking sector concentration does not influence the IRPT. As evidenced 
by this, not only was the theory not in agreement but its disparities were confounded by conflicts 
in the evidence from empirical research.  
Understanding whether or not bank industry concentration is related to a weak or strong IRPT is 
important because it will inform banking sector competition regulation. If concentration impedes 
the IRPT, and consequently effective monetary policy, then it is of paramount importance that 
the banking industry should be regulated to increase the number of market participants and 
reduce concentration. If concentration improves the IRPT then banking regulators may need to 
consider the possibility of consolidating their banking industries to encourage more 
12
 concentration to enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy
5
. In addition to informing 
regulation of the banking industry, identifying a relationship has implications for the setting of 
monetary policy when bank concentration is changing. To illustrate, should bank concentration 
be related to a slower IRPT then the timing of official rate changes must change to ensure that 
they are set early enough to have the desired effect at the desired time. If, on the other hand, bank 
concentration is related to the a weakening of the magnitude of the IRPT then policy changes 
must be large enough to cater for the diminished reflection of official rates in bank lending and 
deposit rates. However, such ambiguity alone would not necessarily merit research if important 
reasons did not exist in favour and against concentrated banking industries.  
In the banking sector, unlike other sectors of the economy, competition policy must take note of 
the interaction between the structure of the banking industry and financial stability. According to 
Allen and Gale (2003), highly concentrated banking markets are better suited to withstand 
financial crises than less concentrated banking markets. This is a view that is supported by Beck 
et al. (2003) who suggest that banking systems characterised by a few large banks are better 
suited to diversify their products and thus lower bank fragility in the event of a crisis. In addition, 
the high profits that banks in such highly concentrated industries make insulate them from 
adverse shocks to the economy while reducing the incentives for their owners to take excessive 
risk. Soludo (2004) adds further support for highly concentrated banking industries by 
highlighting that banking service proliferation is likely to be higher in more concentrated 
markets with a few large banks (with the capital and economies of scale to finance expansion) 
rather than less concentrated markets with many small banks (without capital to finance 
expansion)
6
. Furthermore, the problems of asymmetric information that may result in the 
rationing of credit, to the detriment of economic growth, are reduced by large banks with the 
ability to engage in relationship banking and dedicate large amounts of resources to collecting 
information on potential borrowers (Allen and Gale, 2003).  
                                                            
5 It is important to note that the results on whether high or low bank concentration is related to a weakening or 
strengthening IRPT can only partially inform banking sector competition regulation as there are other implications 
to having a highly/lowly concentrated banking sector that must be considered. For example, questions concerning 
the impact of concentration on financial stability (see Allen and Gale, 2003). 
6 This is a very important point, particularly in Africa where the proliferation of banking services is an important 
part of financial development (Soludo, 2004).  
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 On the other hand, allowing banking sectors to become highly concentrated also presents 
potential drawbacks. In addition to potentially weakening the IRPT, (Hannan and Berger (1991), 
Neumark and Sharpe (1992), and Cottarelli and Kourellis, (1994) suggest that highly 
concentrated markets pose the risk of collusive bank behaviour in which capital is rationed or 
made expensive to maintain high profits for the banks. Furthermore, there is empirical evidence 
refuting the notion that bank concentration is positively related to market stability as suggested 
by Allen and Gale (2003) and Beck et al. (2003). For example, Shehzad and De Haan (2009) 
actually find evidence supporting a negative relationship between the two where less 
concentrated banking systems are more stable during financial crises than more concentrated 
systems.  
This debate has recently come to the fore as deregulation, liberalization and consolidation in the 
banking industry, reflected by growing mergers and acquisitions within and between countries, 
has increasingly prompted concerns about the greater market power enjoyed by banks and the 
subsequent impact on financial stability, the cost of capital and the effectiveness of monetary 
policy (Alegria and Schaeck, 2007: 2 and Jobst and Kwapil, 2008). This debate has been further 
compounded by the recent financial crisis (2007- ) that has raised interest on the merits and 
demerits of highly concentrated banking industries, hence the need to revisit the implications of 
banking concentration on economic performance for which its impact on the IRPT is a crucial 
part. 
Unfortunately, the bulk of the studies on the interest rate pass through (even without an explicit 
consideration for its relationship with banking concentration) have focused on Europe and the 
United States.  A few studies have been conducted in developing countries while even fewer 
have focused on Africa, which is a shortcoming this study will aim to address. 
1.2 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
The aim of this study is to determine the relationship between the level of bank concentration 
(measured by the three firm concentration ratio (CR3) and the interest rate pass through in South 
Africa, Botswana, Nigeria and Zambia. This is in order to provide clarity on the debate in the 
African context where research has been scant. The question asked throughout the study will be 
whether or not higher concentration levels are seen to be consistently associated with either a 
14
 stronger or weaker pass through? More specifically, the study will endeavour to achieve the 
following goals: 
(i) To determine whether there is a relationship between bank concentration and the 
speed of the adjustment of bank lending and deposit rates in response to Central Bank 
interest rate changes;  
(ii) To determine whether there is a relationship between bank concentration and the 
magnitude of the adjustment of bank lending and deposit rates in response to Central 
Bank interest rate changes in either the short or long run; 
(iii) To determine whether the speed and magnitude of the IRPT differ across countries 
and whether those differences are due to differences in the level of bank 
concentration; 
(iv) To determine whether there is asymmetry in either the speed or magnitude of the 
IRPT and whether or not it is related to the level of bank concentration; 
(v) To determine whether changes in the level of banking sector concentration over time 
are related to changes in the speed, magnitude and asymmetry of the IRPT, and 
(vi) To articulate the policy implications of the findings. 
1.3 MOTIVATION FOR THE STUDY 
The merits of the investigation on whether there is a relationship between bank concentration and 
the IRPT have already been presented in Section 1.1. Section 1.3 now presents the motivation 
and key contributions made by this study.  
This study is motivated largely by the need to contribute to the limited existing literature on the 
relationship between bank concentration and the IRPT in Africa. Moreover, it seeks to explicitly 
investigate this relationship where many other studies have simply inferred the presence or 
absence of a relationship from results of studies simply measuring the IRPT, industrial 
organisation theory or a priori beliefs without the presentation of empirical evidence. This study 
will not only investigate the presence of a relationship, but what the nature of that relationship is 
as well. 
15
 In addition, the study hopes to contribute to the body of literature by investigating the important 
issue of bank concentration and the asymmetry in the IRPT. Rather than simply taking the IRPT 
as a symmetric reflection of policy rates in bank lending and deposit rates, the measurement of 
asymmetric responses allows for the identification of conditional relationships between bank 
concentration and the IRPT. For example, where a relationship between bank concentration and 
the symmetric adjustment of lending rates cannot be observed there may be a clear relationship 
between the IRPT and bank concentration for only falling lending rates.  In such a case the 
symmetric investigation would ignore the fact that bank concentration would be related to the 
effectiveness of expansionary monetary policy (when lending rates are expected to fall) and 
erroneously conclude that the IRPT is not related to the level of bank concentration. 
Two important contributions made by this research relate firstly to the investigation of bank 
concentration and the long run impact of policy rates on bank rates when the underlying series 
are not cointegrated and secondly, the investigation of bank concentration and the asymmetric 
long run impact of policy rates on bank rates where the conventional method of asymmetric 
effect determination from series in first differences is inapplicable
7
. 
Additionally, one of the key concerns in studies on developing countries is the lack of sufficient 
information to carry out comprehensive analyses as conducted in developed countries. While this 
study is similarly constrained because of its choice of countries, there is sufficient information 
for this investigation to be undertaken and where informational constraints are met they are duly 
noted
8
. 
1.4 METHODS OF THE STUDY
9
 
The aims of this paper will be achieved by an empirical analysis of monthly data on Central 
Bank/policy interest rates, average commercial lending rates and three to six month deposit rates 
spanning 14 years from 1994 to 2007 (International Financial Statistics (IFS) CD Rom - July 
2009) and three firm concentration ratios (CR3) (A New Database on Financial Development 
                                                            
7 To the knowledge of the author the combination of techniques used in the measurement of the IRPT in this study 
have not been applied in this context before. 
8 The desire to conduct an investigation in Africa and the availability of information and data were the critical 
considerations in the choice of countries for the study. 
9 A more detailed explanation of the methodology is available in Chapter 4. 
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 and Structure 2007 in Beck et al, 2007 and World Bank, 2009)).  Additional data is sourced from 
Central Bank annual reports. 
In this study we measure the IRPT in the selected countries following Li (2003) and Aziakpono 
et al, (2007) and use the Engle and Granger (1987) cointegration method to ascertain whether the 
policy rates are in fact related to bank lending and deposit rates. Thereafter, to meet objective (i) 
we use symmetric and asymmetric error correction frameworks to identify the short run 
dynamics resulting from the cointegrating relationships. These error corrections, in turn, are then 
used to obtain mean adjustment lags (MALs) to ascertain the symmetric and asymmetric speed 
of adjustment of bank rates in response to policy rate changes. The resultant MALs are reviewed 
against the level of concentration to determine whether the speed of the IRPT is related to the 
level of concentration. 
The magnitude of adjustment is measured following Brooks (2008) and Kwapil and Scharler 
(2009) in order to obtain symmetric and asymmetric measures of the magnitude of adjustment of 
deposit and lending rates to Central Bank rate changes for both the short run and the long run. 
These parameters are then compared to the level of concentration to meet objective (ii). 
Objective (iii) will be met by comparing the symmetric speed and magnitude of the IRPT and the 
level concentration, as computed above, between the four countries for the entire sample period. 
Objective (iv) follows a similar procedure except that the comparison looks at the asymmetric 
speed and magnitude of adjustments and compares them to the level of concentration. 
Objective (v) is met by conducting an analysis similar to that for the fulfilment of objectives (iii) 
and (iv) in that it is a comparison of speed and magnitude measures of the IRPT and the level of 
concentration. However, in this case the assessment is done for eight year rolling windows in 
each country
10
. 
The final objective is met following the conclusions drawn from the results of tests conducted to 
meet objectives (i) to (v). 
 
                                                            
10 In line with Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2003) the concentration level is taken as the average of the annual 
concentration ratios over the sample period. 
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 1.5 ORGANISATION OF THE STUDY 
The rest of this study is organised as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical 
literature on the interest rate pass through, bank concentration and the relationship between them. 
Chapter 3 discusses some of the salient features of monetary policy and bank concentration in 
the countries under investigation with a view to providing some preliminary insight into the 
possible relationship between bank concentration and the IRPT. Chapter 4 presents the 
methodology and data used in the study. Chapter 5 presents the empirical results of the research. 
Chapter 6 provides a summary of findings, policy implications and areas for future research.  
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 CHAPTER 2  
A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL LITERATURE REVIEW OF 
INTEREST RATE PASS THROUGH AND BANK CONCENTRATION 
2.1 INTRODUCTION:  
This chapter reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on IRPT and bank concentration. As 
noted in Chapter 1, this study merges a thorough analysis of the speed and magnitude of IRPT 
with an analysis of how this speed and magnitude vary as the level of concentration varies. To 
this end this chapter defines both IRPT and bank concentration and then reviews theory and 
studies on the relationship between IRPT and the level of bank concentration. 
2.2 THEORETICAL LITERATURE 
2.2.1 Interest Rate Pass Through Defined 
Quayyum et al. (2005) describe IRPT as the process through which changes in policy dictated 
interest rates are translated into changes in bank lending and deposit rates. It is measured by the 
speed and the magnitude of the adjustment of the bank lending and deposit rates in response to 
changes in the Central Bank/policy determined rate. Further to this, the most desirable IRPT is 
one that speedily and completely reflects changes in the official rate in the bank lending and 
deposit rates
11
.  
In order to have a full and speedy IRPT it is crucial that bank lending and deposit rates remain 
sensitive to changes in policy determined rates (Gidlow, 2001). To do this Central Banks have at 
their disposal a variety of measures designed to maintain such sensitivity. Popular amongst them 
is the enforcement of a fractional reserve banking system in which compulsory bank cash 
reserves are held by the Central Bank to create a money market shortage that forces banks to 
seek “accommodation” at the policy determined interest rate. This system effectively makes the 
                                                            
11 This is so that the monetary policy authority’s decisions have a meaningful and timely effect. 
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 policy rate the cost of funds for banks which are “compelled”12 to borrow at the policy dictated 
rate.  
Despite being able to describe and identify the IRPT as a conduit of monetary policy, the IRPT 
process does not have an explicitly stated theoretical basis (Hoffman and Mizen, 2001)
13
. 
Consequently, linking the IRPT and bank concentration requires a merger between an 
understanding of the IRPT and the understanding of bank concentration.  
2.2.2 Bank Concentration Defined 
Bank Concentration is a measure of the extent or degree to which a relatively small number of 
banks account for a relatively large percentage of the banking market (Alegria and Schaeck, 
2007: 4)
14
. It can be measured in different ways and two of the most popular methods are 
explored below. 
2.2.2.1 Concentration Ratios 
Concentration ratios measure market concentration by dividing the asset holdings of k number of 
banks by the total assets of the banking industry. It is a relatively simple and very popular 
measure of bank concentration in the literature and the three firm ratio (CR3) is the most popular 
measure in applied work (Bikker, 2000) (Alegria and Schaeck, 2007). The CR3 is calculated as 
follows: 
𝐶𝑅3 =
∑𝑖=1
3 𝑍𝑖
𝑍𝑡
         (2.1) 
Where k is 3,  𝑍𝑖  is the value of the assets held by an individual bank and 𝑍𝑡  is the total number 
of assets in the industry. Unfortunately, the measure does not take into account the number of 
                                                            
12 This is a very simplified version of the process because the system of accommodation works beyond simply the 
activity of the Central Bank as the lender of last resort as implied here. The option to borrow from the interbank 
market also exists and this rate is also influenced by the policy rate. To get a comprehensive view of the interaction 
between banks and the Central Bank see Faure (2006) for an in depth analysis  including how policy rates are still 
made effective without the presence of reserve requirements. 
13 However, there are theories (explored here) regarding why it may be made smoother/stronger or more rigid/weak 
but these are not actually IRPT theories but theories surrounding IRPT changes, for example, theories on bank 
behaviour. 
14 It is important to note that concentration is a relative measure and while absolute measures of what constitutes a 
lowly concentrated or highly concentrated market can be suggested these would be highly contentious and 
subjective in the very least. For the purposes of this investigation concentration is compared between countries and 
over rolling windows (see Chapter 4).  
20
 banks in the industry or the asset holding of banks outside the arbitrary three firm cut off 
(Bikker, 2000). 
2.2.2.2 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
Given the failings of the CR3 measure, a popular alternative is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
(HHI). This index is calculated by squaring the market share of each firm competing in a market, 
and then summing the resulting numbers. As its computation considers the asset holdings of all 
the banks in the industry it avoids the concentration ratio’s problem of having an arbitrary cut 
off. It is calculated as follows: 
𝐻𝐻𝐼 = ∑𝑖=1
𝑛 (
𝑍𝑖
𝑍𝑡
)2        (2.2) 
Where n is equal to the number of firms, 𝑍𝑖  is the value of the assets held by an individual bank 
and 𝑍𝑡  is the total number of assets in the industry. The HHI can range from close to zero 
to 10,000; where a value close to zero indicates a sparsely concentrated market and 10,000 a 
monopoly (Abassoglu et al, 2007: 7). One immediate consequence of attempting to use the HHI 
is that asset holding data is necessary for all firms in the industry rather than just the total 
industry assets and the asset holdings of a few large firms. This can be problematic in cases 
where data is scant
15
.  
While the specific level of concentration can be measured in different ways, what unifies the 
theory is that increased market concentration ultimately results in a greater centralisation of 
market power in the industry. However, what is contentious is whether such a concentration of 
power in the banking sector should be viewed with grave concern or rather as the innocuous 
outcome of increasingly efficient industries.  
2.2.3 Bank concentration and the IRPT 
As noted earlier the question for monetary policy makers has been and still is one of identifying 
the barriers to a full and speedy IRPT
16
. It is regarding this question that pioneering researchers 
                                                            
15 This point is revisited in the methodology where justification for the concentration measure taken in this study is 
presented. 
16 Put differently, policy makers have had to determine what could destroy the important positive relationship 
between market rates (bank lending and deposit rates) and official (policy determined) rates. 
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 like Cottarelli and Kourellis (1994) suggested taking a look at the market structure of the 
banking industry to identify possible impediments to the IRPT.  
In Cottarelli and Kourellis (1994) and subsequent work the focus was on determining what 
specifically about the structure of the banking industry caused the rigidities in the IRPT. Since 
the official rate was communicated directly to the banks, the inability to reflect its changes in 
deposit and lending rates had to lie in the banking industry. There were elements in the banking 
industry that were keeping bank lending and deposit rates unresponsive to policy rate changes 
(Jeon and Miller, 2002). Concentration in the banking sector arose in many studies as potentially 
being the source of such rigidities as high levels (low levels) of concentration appeared to 
provide disincentives (incentives) for swift bank responses to Central Bank interest rate changes. 
Consequently, banking sector concentration became a prominent feature in IRPT rigidity debates 
(Berger et al, 2003).   
The issue amongst researchers still is, whether or not the concentration of the banking sector will 
result in efficient or inefficient pricing strategies by banks and how these will influence the 
rigidity of the IRPT and consequently the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission. Berger 
and Hannan (1989) summarise the impact of bank concentration on the pricing behaviour of 
banks in two conflicting hypotheses.  
On one hand there is the “Structure-Conduct-Performance” (SCP) hypothesis that was pioneered 
by Bain.  This hypothesis suggests that the structure of an industry will influence the conduct of 
its members which will in turn influence the performance of that industry. For example, an 
uncompetitive banking industry (structure) will most likely result in inefficient practices and a 
reduced incentive to quickly respond to monetary policy stance changes (conduct) resulting in a 
sluggish and incomplete IRPT and the poor conduction of monetary policy changes 
(performance).  
The competing hypothesis is the “Efficient Market Hypothesis” (EMH) which suggests that 
concentration would increase the overall efficiency of the banking industry resulting in banks 
pricing their products more competitively. This is based on the understanding that increased 
concentration is due to more efficient banks growing more rapidly than less efficient banks, or 
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 more efficient banks taking over less efficient ones. If this were the case, at least up to some 
point, banks would price their services more competitively
17
, rather than less competitively. 
In addition to these traditional hypotheses bank concentration could also result in asymmetric 
responses in deposit and lending rates when Central Banks changed their policy determined 
rates. If banks could exert their market power on their customers, it would be possible for 
financial institutions to adjust their interest rates asymmetrically. For example, lending interest 
rates could be adjusted relatively fast when official interest rates increase, but the adjustment 
might become sluggish during periods of expansionary monetary policy where official rates are 
declining (Tomasz, 2003).  
There are hypotheses that offer explanations for asymmetries in the responses of lending and 
deposit rates to increases and decreases in policy determined rates. The first is the “collusive 
behaviour hypothesis” and the second is the “adverse consumer reaction hypothesis” both of 
whose effects are influenced by the level of concentration. The “collusive behaviour hypothesis” 
suggests that the more concentrated a market is, the more scope there is for banks to engage in 
collusive behaviour and price their products in an uncompetitive manner and weaken the IRPT. 
Under the “adverse consumer reaction hypothesis” bank lending and deposit rates may be sticky 
up and down respectively as banks fear a loss of customers should they meticulously follow 
changes in the Central Bank rates. (Berger and Hannan, 1989) 
Challengers of the existence of a relationship between bank concentration and the IRPT refute 
the relationships suggested in theory. Rather they cite the importance of bank supervision, 
financial market regulation and the strict enforcement of measures that promote bank sensitivity 
to policy changes (for example, reserve requirements) as the real determinants of the strength or 
weakness of the IRPT and, by implication, any relationship observed between bank 
concentration and the IRPT is in fact purely coincidental (Seater, 2000). 
Kot (2004) suggests that market structure does play a prominent role in IRPT determination by 
suggesting that different degrees of concentration in the banking sector provide incentives for 
different behaviour from banking sector participants. If market concentration is high, banks may 
                                                            
17 Here the word “competitively” is taken to refer to pricing strategies that closely reflect the changes in the official 
rate. This is the case because the competition would remove the scope for large disparities in the two or for slow 
adjustments in the bank rates in response to official rate changes. 
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 tend, for instance, to increase their interest rate margins in periods of falling interest rates by 
reducing their lending rates more slowly than their deposit rates. Similarly, in periods of 
increasing market rates, banks may try to delay a narrowing of their net interest margin by 
passing rising refinancing costs promptly on to their customers in the form of higher lending 
rates while delaying their revision of deposit rates. These actions would serve to weaken the 
IRPT. 
In contrast, Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2008) suggest that there is no theoretical reason to believe 
that there would be a relationship between bank concentration and the strength or weakness of 
the IRPT. It is their assertion that an “error” in equating competition and concentration is the 
reason for conflicting theoretical and empirical evidence. According to them what other studies 
are in fact observing and providing theories on is a relationship between bank competition and a 
smooth IRPT and not between bank concentration and the IRPT.  
Despite the caution sounded by Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2008) early work by Wrightsman (1971: 
202, 203) importantly points out that Central Banks do not themselves directly change retail 
interest rates, rather they influence the conditions in which banks operate with the view that 
those conditions will induce the desired changes in the retail interest rates that are under the 
control of the banks
18
. Given this view of the interaction of the Central Bank and the banks, the 
degree of insulation banks have from the adverse effects of non-compliance is then related to 
their degree of non-compliance (weakening of the IRPT).  Where high levels of market 
concentration are expected to provide insulation from competitive pressures to remain highly 
responsive to policy rate changes, increased concentration will weaken the IRPT.  
So far the theoretical debate has looked at industrial organisation theory and identified the 
expectations that theorists have on their consequences on the possible relationship between bank 
concentration and the strength or weakness of the IRPT. It has not, however, identified a model 
explicitly linking the banking sector market structure to bank pricing decisions and consequently 
the IRPT. The Monti-Klein Model below is a leading authority in this regard (Brock and 
Franken, 2003). 
                                                            
18 Essentially Central Banks try to “force” banks to act in the public interest by changing their lending and 
borrowing rates to suit the greater macroeconomic objectives of the economy. Unfortunately these public interests 
are often at odds with the rational profit seeking incentives of banks. Hence why, in cases where the incentive to 
strictly comply with Central Bank mandated official rates is weak, banks’ responses are slow and incomplete. 
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 2.2.3.1 The Monti-Klein model of banking microstructure 
The Monti-Klein bank model is based on the assumption that there is a cost function for running 
a bank that depends on the aggregate value of the assets (A) being managed by the bank as well 
as other factors of production, such as capital and labour (K, L). In this model, under conditions 
of oligopoly the rational profit maximising spread in the retail rates (𝑟𝐿 − 𝑟𝐷) is a function of 
those factors of production, the aggregate value of bank assets, the semi elasticities of demand 
and supply (ηL, ηD) and very importantly, the number of banks in the industry (N). This is 
represented in the equation below.  
𝑟𝐿 − 𝑟𝐷 =  
1
𝑁
 (
1
𝜂𝐿
+
1
𝜂𝐷
) +  𝛽1𝐴 + 𝛽2𝐾 + 𝛽3𝐿     (2.3) 
Where 𝑟𝐿is the retail interest rate set by banks on lending and  𝑟𝐷 is the retail interest rate set by 
banks on deposits. 
Equation (2.3)
19
 shows how profitability in the banking industry is influenced by the number of 
participants in the industry. More importantly (and relevant to this study) is that it presents the 
setting of bank lending and deposit rates as a function of the banking industry’s market structure. 
As the number of participants and the asset holdings of a bank change it adjusts its lending and 
deposit rates to maintain its interest rate spread. Put simply, the model refutes the idea that 
rational profit maximising banks make decisions independent of the market structure in which 
they are in. Ultimately, this means that the IRPT should be related to the structure of the banking 
industry. This view of bank costs and their operation has been used in the work of Van 
Leuvensteijn et al (2008) and Corvoisier and Gropp (2002).  
In addition, Corvoisier and Gropp (2002) go on to suggest that the strength of the IRPT may also 
be explained by banks’ product-specific concentration indices. This would mean that it would be 
possible to draw misleading conclusions about the relationship between bank interest rates and 
banking sector concentration if the concentration in question was that at the industry level rather 
than the product level.  
                                                            
19 This is synthesised from the more elaborate presentation of the Monti-Klein model in Van Leuvensteijn et al 
(2008). 
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 In addition to the Monti-Klein specification of bank pricing behaviour, De Bondt (2002) puts 
forward a simpler marginal cost pricing method. The method suggests that a bank’s interest rate 
(lending and deposit) “IB” is equal to a mark up “X” plus a fraction “β” of the policy interest rate 
“IM”. Algebraically this is represented as follows: 
𝐼𝐵 = 𝑋 + 𝛽(𝐼𝑀)        (2.4) 
Under perfectly competitive conditions the pass through parameter “β” is 1; which means that 
shocks in the official rates are fully reflected in the individual bank’s interest rates. Should it be 
below one because of a lack of perfect information or bankers’ resistance to monetary policy 
impulses, the changes in official rates are not fully reflected in the individual bank’s interest 
rates. Equation 2.4 sets a model on which empirical investigations of IRPT can be conducted 
(see Chapter 4). In relation to concentration, where concentration can be found to influence “β”, 
concentration can be seen to influence the IRPT. 
2.2.4 Summary of Theoretical Review 
This theoretical review presented the varying views on the theoretical relationship between the 
IRPT and bank concentration. Conflict reigned as to whether there was a relationship and if so 
whether it was negative as suggested by the SCP or positive as suggested by the EMH. Some 
evidence was presented to challenge the need to look at banking market structure to identify 
links it may have to a weak or strong IRPT while some theorists identified the false equating of 
concentration and competition as the root of the ambiguity on the matter. In addition it identified 
(through the Monti-Klein model) how the rational profit maximising decisions of banks may 
create a relationship between bank concentration and the IRPT. 
What is however clear is that there is no clear theoretical evidence to refute or support the 
presence of a relationship between bank concentration and the IRPT, let alone whether such a 
relationship is positive or negative. It is thus imperative that an investigation of empirical 
literature be taken to find evidence on the actual relationship between bank concentration and the 
IRPT. 
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 2.3 EMPIRICAL REVIEW 
The empirical research on this topic has been primarily concerned with investigating reasons for 
retail rate rigidities in the light of official rate changes and so presents a myriad of factors that 
influence the IRPT, of which bank concentration is only one factor
20
. Researchers have aimed to 
present empirical evidence that explains these rigidities by tying them to a variety of factors 
relating to the banking sector’s microstructure and its operation. More specifically, these papers 
have sought to explain the rigidity through structural characteristics of the banking sector, such 
as: the development of the banking industry, the ownership structure and the barriers to entry 
(Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994), Cottarelli et al. (1995)). Hannan and Berger (1991) and Mojon 
(2000) actually linked these rigidities to market concentration and the degree of competition 
while Weth (2002) and Berstein and Fuentes (2003) connected the rigidity to individual bank 
characteristics like bank size, liquidity, long-term customer relations, the type of customers and 
the risk associated with the loan portfolios of banks. Simply by looking at the conflicting 
conclusions drawn in these studies the clearest evidence on the presence and nature of a 
relationship is that there is no consensus on either the presence or nature of the relationship.  
The rest of the empirical review is divided into an in-depth review of literature, firstly, on 
developed and secondly, developing countries
21
. 
2.3.1 Developed countries  
The bias in the research on this topic is heavily slanted towards developed countries where data 
on interest rates and banking microstructure is plentiful and varied. This has allowed researchers 
investigating similar geographical areas to arrive at startlingly conflicting results.  
A leading authority on the issue comes from the work of Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) which 
first measured the speed of the adjustment of bank lending rates in 31 industrial and developing 
countries by regressing the lending rate on a distributed lag of money market rates. In this way, 
they estimated the effect on lending rates of shocks in money market rates following these 
                                                            
20 This is to say that while the question of whether a relationship exists or not is indicated in a considerable amount 
of literature fewer studies have focused on explicitly investigating the relationship between the IRPT and bank 
concentration.  
21 As this study will focus on developing countries in Africa it would be prudent to review the outcome of research 
in different countries at different stages of economic development in order to provide some insight in what may be 
expected in the results of this study. 
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 shocks after three months, after six months, and in the long run. Secondly, it explained the cross-
country differences in these multipliers by regressing them on several variables related to the 
structure of the financial system, such as the degree of concentration in the banking industry, the 
existence of constraints on capital flows and barriers to entry, and the size and the efficiency of 
the money market. Using monthly data on lending, discount and money market rates from the 
Bank of International Settlements, they found that the degree of stickiness was quite different 
across countries, particularly in the very short run. The impact multiplier (defined as the change 
in the lending rate observed during the month in which the money market rate changes) was 
close to unity in some countries but as low as zero in others. Significant differences could also 
still be observed after three and six months. In the long run, however, the adjustment was close 
to unity for most countries. Banking sector concentration, however, did not have a significant 
effect on the pass through.  
Cottarelli et al (1995) studied 63 banks in Italy from June 1986-December 1993.  Using an error 
correction model on monthly data over the period they established that bank concentration did 
have a significant impact on the IRPT.  In this work they highlighted how the preceding work of 
Cottarelli and Kourellis (1994) had tried to factor in concentration in their calculation by simply 
taking the market share of the five largest banks (CR5).  Rather, in this study, they used the HHI. 
This allowed them to conclude that differences in the degree of lending rate stickiness among 
Italian banks was to a large extent due to the different degrees of concentration (as measured by 
the Herfindahl index) of the local loan markets in which banks operated: banks operating in less 
concentrated markets adjusted their lending rates faster.  
In contrast to this finding, Berstein and Fuentes (2003) produced results that were similar to 
Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994). They found that the speed of adjustment was affected by banking 
sector expectations and interest rate volatility, but not concentration. Taking monthly data on 
deposit interest rates of different maturities in Chile from May 1995 to December 2002 and 
concentration ratios of the three largest (CR3) banks, the five largest banks (CR5) and the HHI, 
their study showed that bank interest rates responded by between 75% and 88% to changes in the 
interbank interest rate. The authors, however, conceded that their results were not in line with 
their expectations and so sought an explanation. In their research they found that concentration 
affected the coefficient of the lagged variables in their model and thus it had a long run influence 
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 that could be missed in a short run analysis. From this they concluded that market concentration 
negatively affected the interest rate pass through. The only issue being one of when this effect 
would be felt in the pass through. Additionally, they could not find evidence of asymmetries in 
the pass through between changes increasing or decreasing interest rates. 
Abbasoglu et al (2005) presented another study that refuted the link between the interest rate 
pass through rigidity and the level of concentration in the banking sector. Their study uses data 
from the detailed balance sheets of the banks that operated in the years from 2001 to 2005 in 
Turkey which they obtained from the Bank Association of Turkey. During this period the 
number of banks in the Turkish economy was decreasing due to mergers and acquisitions making 
the country an ideal candidate for comparative analysis as the trend over the years could be 
documented.  In 2001 there were 61 banks while in 2005 there were 48. By taking the 
concentration ratios of the three largest (CR3) and five largest (CR5) banks and the HHI as 
measures of concentration and comparing them to the IRPT they were able to conclude that there 
was no support for a link between banking sector concentration and the IRPT. 
However, having anticipated the possibility that their results may not provide conclusive results 
on the influence of banking structure and IRPT rigidities, Abbasoglu et al (2005) also took a 
Panzar-Rose
22
 measure of competition to assess if it could provide a better explanation for 
interest rate rigidities in the banking sector. Of importance in their final results was the fact that 
even though concentration itself failed to explain the IRPT rigidity, competition appeared to be 
the likely influence of the rigidities. This result is particularly important when it is considered 
that opponents of the theoretical link between IRPT rigidities and the level of banking sector 
concentration argue that when the link is made in empirical studies the studies are often 
capturing the influence of competition rather than concentration. Additionally, since competition 
and concentration may be closely linked it is not difficult to envisage such a possibility
23
.  
Following this thread, Van Leuvensteijn et al (2008) took monthly data from the Bankscope 
database of banks on mortgages, consumer loans and short-term loans to enterprises in eight 
                                                            
22 The measures of competition are not explained in this study but are available in the studies from which they are 
cited.  
23 Such a link exists where the performance of an industry (competitiveness) is greatly influenced by the structure of 
the firms in the industry (concentration). Where concentration is high, for example, competitive pressures may be 
abated by tacit collusion on the parts of the participating firm. In such a situation concentration and competition are 
closely and negatively related.  
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 Euro area countries from 1992 to 2004; namely Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain. Using an error correction model and the Boone measure of 
competition on this panel data they concluded that all the bank loan rates did indeed respond 
significantly more strongly to market rates when competition was high and that, all in all, 
competition did make for stronger long-run bank rate responses to corresponding market rate 
changes. Furthermore, Van Leuvensteijn et al (2008: 16) suggested that many studies turn to 
concentration as a proxy for competition and so a considerable amount of research that has 
mapped interest rate rigidities against the level of banking sector concentration were in fact 
attempting to test these rigidities against banking market competition. For them, it was for this 
reason that concentration results yielded (and would continue to yield) ambiguous results. 
Earlier work by Mojon (2000) had also suggested the influence of competition and not 
concentration as a factor determining the speed of the IRPT.  By taking deposit and lending rates 
in six euro countries over two ten year periods from 1979 to 1988 and from 1988 to 1998 and 
applying an error correction model, he identified rigidities in the IRPT. However, in explaining 
his results he did not point to market concentration as an influence on IRPT rigidity; rather, he 
pointed to menu costs, bank expectations of the direction of monetary policy and implicit interest 
rate assurance as the significant factors hampering a smooth IRPT. These findings were 
supported by the work of Neumark and Sharpe (1992) that similarly identified menu costs and 
interest rate assurance, respectively, as the key factors in interest rate rigidities. 
Corvoisier and Gropp (2002) decided on a more detailed product-specific measure of the impact 
of bank concentration on the determination of retail interest rates. They constructed a country-
specific, product-specific Cournot model for EU countries for the period: 1993 to 1999. 
Additionally, the HHI was used rather than simple concentration ratios that exclude the 
consideration of small banks in their calculation. Their results showed that moderately 
concentrated banking markets (e.g. Belgium) in comparison to highly concentrated markets (e.g. 
the Netherlands) displayed differences in bank margins for loans by as much as 200 basis points. 
Furthermore, these results seemed to support the “structure conduct performance hypothesis,” 
which suggested that higher market concentration would result in collusion. 
Corvoisier and Gropp (2002) also investigated demand deposits and observed a similar result, 
where higher concentration was also associated with higher margins. In contrast, for savings and 
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 time deposits, they found that higher concentration (again comparing Belgium to the 
Netherlands) resulted in margins, which were 100 to 200 basis points lower in more concentrated 
markets. For this the authors suggested that every market presented its own idiosyncratic features 
that encouraged varied responses from banks, for example, for products where rate change 
sensitivity by customers is high rate changes will be as mild and as infrequent as possible. This 
could result in compensatory adjustment in the rates of other products where resistance may be 
low and switching costs for consumers high. 
Given the ambiguity presented by the product level analysis of Corvoisier and Gropp (2002) it 
appears that conflicting results on the relationship between concentration and retail interest rate 
adjustments may be a question of the specific product in question rather than a universal truth in 
favour or in opposition of their relationship. 
De Bondt (2005) took average monthly data on the Euro area from January 1996 to May 2001. 
Using a vector error-correction framework to analyse the immediate and final pass-through and 
speed of the IRPT, he found that the immediate pass-through of market interest rates to retail 
bank interest rates was incomplete, in line with previous cross-country studies. The proportion of 
a given market interest rate change that was passed through within one month was found, at its 
highest, to be around 50%. The pass-through was higher in the longer term and notably for bank 
lending rates close to 100%. The most sticky retail bank interest rates in the euro area were the 
interest rates on overnight deposits and deposits redeemable at notice of up to three months with 
a long-term pass-through of at most 40%. To explain the differences in the pass through in the 
deposit and lending rates, De Bondt suggested a look at competition in the banking industry for 
an explanation. While this work leant towards competition rather than concentration as the 
reason for the rigidities it did not eliminate it as a possibility as was the case in some preceding 
work (Cottarelli and Kourelis, 1994 and Van Leuijenstein, 2008).  
Although the work of Hannan and Berger (1991) did not explicitly tackle the question of interest 
rate pass through it did (like other papers on banking microstructure and price setting) test the 
structure conduct performance hypothesis in the US Banking industry. Given the dependence of 
the relationship of market concentration and IRPT rigidity on the Bain’s S-C-P model, the ability 
to refute the model in the banking sector would also question the need to consider market 
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 concentration when investigating IRPT rigidities
24
. They presented a regression of bank 
concentration on bank deposit rates using quarterly data on 470 banks from the Federal Reserve 
survey from 1983 to 1985 and taking CR3 and HHI as measures of concentration in the savings 
and loan market. The empirical results were strongly consistent with the implications of the 
structure-conduct performance hypothesis. Banks in the most concentrated local markets in the 
sample were found to pay MMDA (Money market deposit account) rates that ranged from 25 to 
100 basis points less than those paid in the least concentrated markets. 
 2.3.2 Developing countries 
While considerable research has been conducted in developed countries to establish the 
relationship between bank concentration and the IRPT
25
 such research is not as plentiful in 
developing countries and is markedly scant in Africa. Scholnick (1996: 485) offers an 
explanation for this by noting that “data is typically unavailable in developing countries”. 
Consequently, in the instances where research was done the researchers have had to attempt to 
answer the question with limited amounts of data. In Scholnick’s (1996) investigation of 
asymmetries in the adjustment of commercial bank interest rates in Malaysia and Singapore he 
was forced to introduce a different approach, using only the time-series data that was available. 
Nonetheless, using cointegration and an asymmetric vector error-correction model, he 
investigated the IRPT from 1983:1 to 1992:11 for Malaysia, and from 1983:1 to 1994:4 for 
Singapore
26
.  
The main findings of this paper were that it identified differences in the adjustment of deposit 
rates in the two countries when they were different from a preset equilibrium level. Interest rates 
were rigid when they were below their equilibrium level than when they were above it. This 
implied that banks in these countries tended to adjust their deposit rates downward more rapidly 
than upward. Put another way IRPT would be different for increases and decreases in official 
rates
27
. By showing that IRPT could be described beyond being strong or weak, potential 
                                                            
24 What Hannan and Berger (1991) were investigating was whether market concentration constituted a significant 
influence in the decision by banks to set deposit and lending rates. 
25 The bulk of the research has focused on the European Union and the implications that banking structure in 
individual countries will have on the effectiveness of Euro-level monetary policy. 
26 Data was obtained from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics CD-ROM 
27 Given that theory also suggests that asymmetries may exist for deposit and lending rates (Debondt, 2003). The 
permutations for the IRPT are increased. In other words, the IRPT could be different if measured on deposit rates 
32
 relationships with bank concentration were opened, for example, where concentration may not 
have been related to a symmetric adjustment in deposit rates after Central Bank rate changes 
there may be a clear relationship between bank concentration and rigidity in the reduction of 
deposit rates.  
In Pakistan, Quayyum et al. (2005) used monthly data on call money, deposit and lending rates 
in response to Treasury bill rate changes for a period spanning thirteen years from March 1991 to 
December 2004. By using Box et al’s “Intervention Approach” their results revealed that while 
the impact on call rates was immediate the impact on deposit and lending rates was sluggish. 
Given that the authors had anticipated the sluggishness, the reasons for it were suggested as 
twofold. Firstly, banks’ menu costs played a significant part in the decision to adjust lending and 
deposit rates. Secondly, the oligopolistic structure of the Pakistani banking system 
accommodated sluggish deposit and lending rate responses in the face of T-bill interest rate 
adjustments. 
Egert et al. (2005) looked at five Central and Eastern European countries – the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia in order to determine the IRPT in these “transition 
economies”. Using a single bi-variate error correction equation (as was popularly the case in the 
literature) and a cointegrated VAR framework on monthly data from 1994 to 2004 they 
established the following: there was a lower pass-through for overnight and long-term household 
deposit rates in Hungary, a moderately lower pass-through for deposit rates in Poland, a 
moderately lower pass-through for long-term corporate loan rates in Hungary and for short-term 
and long-term corporate loan rates in Poland. However, estimations failed to establish any 
significant relationship between monetary policy rates on the one hand, and deposit rates in 
Slovakia, as well as aggregate household loan rates (and consumer loan rates) in the Czech 
Republic and Slovenia. Having determined the existence of a subdued IRPT it remained for the 
authors to identify the cause of the rigidity. To this the authors pointed to banking sector 
competition and concentration. Additionally, they expected the increase of the latter in Poland 
and Slovakia to bring about an even weaker IRPT. One peculiarity in their results was the fact 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
after an increase in official rates, on deposit rates after a decrease in official rates, on lending rates after an increase 
in official rates and on lending rates after a decrease in official rates. Furthermore, if Hoffman and Mizen’s (2005) 
identification of IRPT sensitivity to the size of the official rate changes are considered the permutations become 
considerably higher. 
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 that their estimations of the strength of the relationship were lower than in previous estimations. 
This, they argued, was because previous studies had relied on error correction models without 
explicitly checking for cointegrating relationships. 
In Columbia, Betancourt et al. (2008) used an error correction and a VARX
28
 model based on a 
Monti-Klein interpretation of bank decision making. Using monthly data from 1999 to 2006 they 
found that their estimations implied that the short run interest rate pass-through to the deposit 
rate was incomplete while in the long run the transmission of a change in the policy rate was 
complete. To explain the rigidity they highlighted that the banking sector microstructure 
contained important information relating to the operation of the IRPT. 
The analysis of empirical evidence on the IRPT and bank concentration does not leave one with 
a clear idea of the relationship between bank concentration and the IRPT. Rather it highlights 
strong contention over the relationship. It is because strong evidence exists in support and 
disagreement over the influence and the degree of the influence, of banking sector concentration 
on the smooth operation of the IRPT that an investigation of the relationship is merited in Africa. 
This is made particularly important given the critical role banks play in the monetary policy of 
developing countries (Egert et al, 2005).  
2.3.3 Summary of Empirical Review 
The empirical literature still suffers from the same ambiguity as the theory did on whether there 
is a relationship between bank concentration and the strengthening/weakening of the IRPT. It is 
particularly because of the little research into the field in developing countries and the fact that 
empirical evidence is conflicting that it is imperative that an Africa focused study be undertaken 
to answer the question in the African context. If empirical evidence had been unified in its 
assessment then the results from these studies could be extrapolated to the African case but this 
is not the reality. To assess whether decreasing or increasing bank concentration in Africa will 
harm or enhance the IRPT and consequently effective monetary policy requires investigations 
such as the one carried out in this study. 
 
                                                            
28 This is similar to the conventional VAR model except it includes exogenous variables in the system.  
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 2.4 CONCLUSION 
The clearest observation, having reviewed the theory and empirical literature, is its disagreement 
in its conclusions.  On one hand, the Structure Conduct Performance hypothesis suggests that 
high bank concentration will retard the IRPT while, on the other, the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis suggests that high bank concentration will be associated with a stronger IRPT. This 
ambiguity is further compounded by conflicting empirical evidence. As a result there is a need 
for an investigation in the African context to determine whether bank concentration is actually 
related to the IRPT in Africa as no theory or empirical evidence can simply be extended to the 
African case. 
Given this need to actually perform empirical research to identify if there is a relationship 
between bank concentration and the IRPT in Africa, the next chapter now provides an overview 
of the four countries under investigation in this study.  
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 CHAPTER 3  
AN OVERVIEW OF MONETARY POLICY AND THE BANKING 
INDUSTRY IN THE SELECTED COUNTRIES 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Since one of the goals of this study is to draw policy implications for bank regulation and 
monetary policy from its empirical results, it is prudent that it presents a brief summary of the 
salient features of monetary policy and the banking industries of the four countries under 
investigation. This overview provides background information on the countries, an indication of 
what our empirical results are likely to be and it may also help to explain any intuitively 
unappealing results we may find
29
.  
The rest of the chapter is divided as follows: Section 3.2 outlines monetary policy in the 
countries, Section 3.3 presents the features of the banking industry and the evolution of the bank 
concentration, Section 3.4 charts the trend between bank concentration and the net interest rate 
margin between bank lending and deposit rates, and Section 3.5 shows official rates against bank 
lending and deposit rates. Finally, Section 3.6 concludes the chapter and provides some 
preliminary insight into the interaction between bank concentration and the level of interest rates 
in all the countries. 
3.2 MONETARY POLICY 
3.2.1 South Africa  
The primary objective of monetary policy in South Africa is to protect the value of the currency 
in order to obtain balanced and sustainable economic growth in the country (Mboweni, 2000). To 
this end, the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) has adopted financial stability (through price 
stability) as the focal point of monetary policy. This inflation targeting framework has been in 
operation since 2000 and has been used with a view to limiting volatility and uncertainty in the 
price level. Critically, this stability in the price level is expected to attract investment with long 
term growth benefits (Mboweni, 2000). 
                                                            
29 As cautioned by preceding work in developing countries, data is scant and this overview is crafted from a variety 
of sources to provide some insight into the countries under study. 
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 In contrast, monetary policy in 1994 still used monetary aggregates as targets despite the fact that 
monetary aggregates had long since been abandoned by advanced economies (for instance, the 
UK and US). In addition, until the adoption of inflation targeting, the only revision in the focus 
of monetary policy was that the monetary targets were supplemented by an eclectic set of 
indicators, including exchange rates, asset prices, wage settlements and the balance of payments 
(Aron and Muellbauer, 2007).  
Despite differences in the targets of monetary policy between the periods of 1994 to 2000 and 
2000 to 2007 the Central Bank still enacted monetary policy through the impact of policy rates 
on bank lending and deposit rates (Aziakpono et al, 2007: 6). However, there were differences in 
how these lending and deposit rates were influenced. Before 1998, the SARB used the “Bank 
Rate System” which employed accommodation rates that offered limited liquidity to banks 
through overnight loans. However, from March 1998 the Central Bank used the “Repo rate 
system” which utilised repurchase agreements (repos) between itself and banks that were 
designed to finance the bank liquidity shortages created by statutory bank reserve requirements 
(Gidlow, 1998). 
Since the implementation of the inflation targeting framework monetary policy has generally 
been effective in maintaining a controlled level of inflation within its targeted bracket of three to 
six percent. This target inflation level was successfully maintained until recently when mammoth 
inflationary pressure was created globally by unstable oil prices and global concern over 
financial markets (South African Reserve Bank, 2009). The fact that monetary policy has 
generally been successful is important to note as any evidence of a relationship between bank 
concentration and the IRPT in our empirical results must be interpreted in the knowledge that 
monetary policy targets have generally been achieved.  
3.2.2 Botswana  
The Bank of Botswana’s monetary policy objective is to achieve a sustainable, low and 
predictable level of inflation. The Bank of Botswana uses open market operations and interest 
rates to affect demand conditions in the economy and ultimately the rate of price changes (Bank 
of Botswana, 2009). The management of policy follows a medium term forecasting framework 
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 that uses a rolling window period of three years. Over the period the inflation forecast is 
measured against the prevailing monetary policy stance and the stance is adjusted appropriately. 
Prior to 1989 monetary policy in Botswana was informed by a Keynesian “forced saving” 
approach that advocated a strong emphasis on investment spending for long term growth. This 
approach advocated strong controls over bank interest rates guided by the resolute belief that 
increased investment justified such financially repressive policies (Setlhare, 2004: 3). In 1989 the 
failure of the approach to lead to productive investment resulted in the adoption of market 
orientated approaches to monetary policy and the liberalisation of financial markets. In 1991 the 
Bank of Botswana began issuing Bank of Botswana certificates as part of its open market 
operations for monetary policy implementation and began its current market based approach to 
monetary policy implementation. 
The transition did not change the focus on growth and stability in the price level. Until 2008 
these objectives were pursued through targeting an inflation level that fell within predetermined 
annual bounds. These flexible target boundaries were set according to prevailing macroeconomic 
conditions which were designed to make the boundaries realistic and achievable. Ultimately this 
inflation targeting framework was set to contribute towards the broader national objectives of 
sustainable economic growth and development through the promotion of savings mobilisation 
and productive investment. Furthermore, the ability to effectively control inflation would also be 
expected to support the international competitiveness of domestic producers (Bank of Botswana, 
2009). 
However, this annual inflation targeting framework was questioned in 2007 after the failure of 
the Central Bank to maintain inflation within its target levels and the realisation that inflation 
could only be realistically achieved in the medium term because of the time lag for monetary 
policy to impact price developments (Mohohlo, 2008). The abandonment of the annual targets 
has not removed inflation targeting in Botswana, rather, the forecasting and targeting of inflation 
was revised to look at a rolling window period of three years (medium-term) rather than one year 
(Bank of Botswana, 2009).  
At the end of 2007 the Bank of Botswana’s monetary policy approach was still considered 
effective despite having problems meeting inflation targets hence the revision of the approach to 
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 create longer horizons for inflation targets rather than a total abandonment of the framework 
(Bank of Botswana, 2009). 
3.2.3 Nigeria  
Monetary policy in Nigeria is focused on controlling inflation and maintaining a healthy Balance 
of Payments position in order to safeguard the external value of the national currency and 
promote an adequate and sustainable level of economic growth and development in support of 
the economic policy of the federal government. These goals are achieved by controlling money 
supply in order to enhance price stability (low and stable inflation) and economic growth 
(Central Bank of Nigeria, 2009). 
Despite the growth in the popularity of inflation targeting the principal target for monetary policy 
is still the control of monetary aggregates. However, since the adoption of the Structural 
Adjustment Programme in 1986 the control of these aggregates has been achieved through the 
use of market instruments rather than credit ceilings and interest rate controls. Open market 
operations, complemented by cash reserve requirements, are now the principal tools of monetary 
policy implementation (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2009). 
Implicit in this approach to monetary transmission is the knowledge that financial markets 
possess the depth and breadth to make the open market operations effective. Prior to 1986 
financial markets were not developed enough for such an approach
30
 
Monetary policy has generally been effective in maintaining its aim of a controlled level of 
inflation and at the end of 2007 Nigeria had single digit inflation and positive economic growth 
(Central Bank of Nigeria, 2009). 
3.2.4 Zambia 
The primary objective of monetary policy in Zambia is to ensure the maintenance of price 
stability to promote balanced macroeconomic development (Bank of Zambia, 2009).  While 
single digit inflation is a key focal point for policy makers, reserve money is still the operating 
                                                            
30 The need for financial system development ultimately led to the creation of many small banks as attempts to 
develop the financial system encouraged an increase in the number of banks. This was an increase that culminated in 
89 registered banks and a need to force a consolidation of the banking industry in 2004 (Soludo, 2004). 
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 target of monetary policy while broad money, defined as including the foreign exchange deposits 
of commercial banks (M3), is the intermediate target of monetary policy. In addition, the Central 
Bank operates a fractional reserve banking system in which it ensures that commercial banks are 
consistently indebted to the Central Bank (Bank of Zambia, 2009). This is designed to make 
banks more sensitive to Central Bank action. 
Since the beginning of a strong effort in 1992 to liberalise the financial markets, the reliance of 
Zambian monetary policy on market-related tools for its implementation has increased. Where 
previously direct controls were sufficient to control monetary policy they are now only a small 
component of the arsenal used. 
While the Bank of Zambia was able to set and maintain inflation targets until 2007, the ability to 
continue to do so has recently been questioned by the failure to meet its policy targets (Bank of 
Zambia, 2009). However, this failure has been largely attributed to global financial pressures on 
food prices and not a failure of the monetary policy framework (Bank of Zambia, 2009). 
3.3 THE BANKING INDUSTRY 
3.3.1 South Africa  
At the inception of democracy in South Africa in 1994 the banking industry was comprised of 35 
registered banks of which the three largest were Standard Bank, ABSA and First National Bank 
(SARB, 1994). With democracy came the reintroduction of the country to the international 
community and the emergence of a large previously repressed population that encouraged an 
increase in the number of banks. At this time a Policy Board for Financial Services and 
Regulation (est.1993) was in place and operated on the leading principle of competitive 
neutrality. What was evident in the formation of such a body was the concern that the banking 
industry structure required monitoring to ensure its expansion was not coupled with weak 
competition and monopoly pricing. Even as early as 1993 the issues of the implication of the 
market structure in the banking industry were considered to be of paramount importance. 
However, Falkena’s (2004) identification of a “complex monopoly” in the South African 
banking system suggested that the concerns over competition actually materialised. 
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 From 1994 to 1998 the increase in participation in the industry and the expansion of the market 
slowly diluted the concentration of the banking industry. There were 39 registered banks in 1998 
but the industry still remained very concentrated and the top three banks of 1994 remained 
unchanged. However, after 1998 (as Figure 3.1 shows) the banking industry concentration began 
to increase. Only in 2003 did the declining trend in the bank concentration return. One possible 
reason for the change in 1998 can be attributed to Russia’s default on its public debt. Such a 
major default would have invariably increased uncertainty and fear in financial markets around 
the world, leading to a movement of funds to established market participants. However, by 2003 
the highly publicised collapse of Saambou Bank had effectively been dealt with by bank 
regulatory authorities who, in so doing, would have improved consumer confidence and 
consequently, increased the market share of smaller banks. 
At present the concentration of the banking industry has come to the fore as the sub-prime 
mortgage crisis of 2007 has renewed debate on the banking concentration-stability nexus. The 
relatively strong performance of the highly concentrated South African banking industry has 
necessitated the need to investigate whether a high concentration of the banking industry is 
necessarily an unhealthy position as the merits of a strong banking sector during a crisis seem 
vindicated by the relative lack of crisis in the South African banking industry while global 
banking industries struggle.   
Figure 3.1 is a graphical representation of the trend in the three firm concentration ratios from 
1994 to 2007: 
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 FIGURE 3.1: BANK CONCENTRATION IN SOUTH AFRICA
 
Source: Adapted from a New Database on Financial Development Structure 2007 (World Bank, 2009). (The vertical axis denotes the proportion 
of the market held by the three top firms while the horizontal axis presents the year) 
 
As illustrated above, bank concentration in South Africa has fallen between 70% and 10% over 
the sample period. There was an annual decline in concentration from 1994 until 1998 when 
concentration was at it s lowest level at 72%.  Thereafter it rose to a peak close to 100% in 2003 
after which it declined to a level of 77% in 2007. On average bank concentration was 88%, the 
second highest level in the sample of four countries. 
3.3.1 Botswana  
In 1989 the monetary authorities in Botswana decided to depart from the “forced savings 
approach” of the Keynesians that advocated a system of investment promotion even at the 
expense of negative real interest rates (Setlhare, 2004). Instead they adopted a system of 
liberalisation in which exchange rate controls
31
 were relaxed and banks were given more 
discretion in setting interest rates in order to draw more participants to the banking sector. By 
relaxing exchange and interest rate controls the Bank of Botswana effectively broke the two firm 
duopoly held by Barclays Bank and Standard Chartered Bank (Kayawe, 2003: 5). 
By 2000
32
 the number of registered commercial banks had increased to five from the two in 
1989. Despite the increase in the number of banks, and consequently the dilution of industry 
concentration, Barclays Bank and Standard Chartered still dominated the industry. In 
                                                            
31 This provided greater scope for profiting from international transactions. 
32 Accessible online Bank of Botswana Bank Supervision Reports start in the year 2000. 
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 combination with First National Bank of Botswana they were the top three banks in the country. 
This can be seen in the concentration data in Appendix H, where market concentration is falling 
but remains above 95% still suggesting a very high level of concentration.  
By 2007 there were seven registered banks and even though the top three banks remained 
unchanged, the market was less concentrated than it had previously been. In our sample, at a 
three firm concentration level of 77% the three firm concentration of the industry was still higher 
than most advanced countries (see World Bank, 2009) but it had fallen 23% since its 1998 peak 
of 1. 
Over the study period the focus in Botswana was one of allowing increasing numbers of banking 
sector participants to develop its financial system. Below is a graphical representation (Figure 
3.2) of the trend in the three firm concentration ratios from 1994 to 2007: 
FIGURE 3.2: BANK CONCENTRATION IN BOTSWANA
 
Source: Adapted from a New Database on Financial Development Structure 2007 (World Bank, 2009). (The vertical axis denotes the proportion 
of the market held by the three top firms while the horizontal axis presents the year) 
 
The trend shows a general decline in the level of bank concentration over the period. Bank 
concentration begins at 97% in 1994 and “settles” at 78% in 2007 while averaging 91% over the 
entire period.  This makes Botswana the country with the highest level of bank concentration in 
our sample.  
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 3.3.2Nigeria  
At the end of 2007 Nigeria had 24 registered banks of which the three largest banks were First 
National Bank, Union Bank of Africa and Intercontinental Bank (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2008). 
The number of banks in 2007 was a dramatic reduction from the 89 registered banks operating in 
2004 before the Central Bank undertook a bank consolidation exercise in July 2004. The exercise 
increased reserve requirements from two billion Naira to 25 Billion Naira to force consolidation 
in the industry because of concerns that the banking industry structure (characterised by many 
small banks) was not designed to succeed in an environment of growing “internationalisation of 
finance” (Soludo, 2004: 2).  
Prior to this, Nigeria had sought to tackle the challenge that internationalised finance posed by 
deregulating the financial sector. This had culminated in the increase in the number of banks 
without significant growth in the size of the banks. One of the problems this posed became a 
supporting point for the consolidation exercise. Despite the number of banks, the proliferation of 
banking services still lagged behind countries characterised by fewer banks. For example in 2004 
Korea had eight banks with over 4500 branches while all 89 Nigerian banks had only 3300 
branches and a combined asset base less than that of just one of the big banks in South Africa 
(ABSA) (Soludo, 2004: 5).  
Before the consolidation exercise the Nigerian banking industry was characterised by several 
bank failures. Between 1994 and 1998 the economy had 31 banks that failed that reduced the 
concentration of the banking industry
33
 (Central Bank of Nigeria, 2009). Figure 3.3 is a graphical 
representation of the trend in the 3 firm concentration ratios from 1994 to 2007: 
 
 
 
                                                            
33 It is important to note that there may be cases the data may appear to disagree with intuition regarding the trend in 
concentration after a significant change to the industry but this may come down to the measure of concentration 
used rather than actual discrepancies. For example, the 3-firm concentration may fall after a reduction in bank 
numbers because of the growth of banks outside the three firm limit. For example the bank consolidation exercise in 
2004 appears to record only a slight increase in concentration despite drastically reducing the number of banking 
sector participants. 
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 FIGURE 3.3: BANK CONCENTRATION IN NIGERIA
 
Source: Adapted from a New Database on Financial Development Structure 2007 (World Bank, 2009). (The vertical axis denotes the proportion 
of the market held by the three top firms while the horizontal axis presents the year) 
 
As shown above, bank concentration can be divided into two periods: an initial period from 1994 
to 1998 where bank concentration is declining and a subsequent period from 1999 to 2007 when 
concentration did not significantly vary. Over the entire period bank concentration falls between 
39% and 80% and averages 67%, which is the lowest concentration of our four sample countries.  
3.3.3 Zambia  
Since the adoption of financial reforms in 1991 that led to a more liberalised financial sector, the 
Zambian banking industry has been characterised by several problems that include the collapse 
of major banks and the stunted growth of national banks (Musonda, 2008).   The desire to grow 
the financial sector resulted in low capital requirements for bank start-ups. For as little as 20 000 
US dollars a bank could be registered and so by 1997 twelve new banks had been given licenses 
(Zambia News Online, 1997). Unfortunately, the expansion in bank numbers was not matched by 
an expansion in the demand for banking services and so from 1995 to 1998 six banks were 
liquidated (Musonda, 2008). However, fearing that the collapse of banks could result in further 
financial sector instability tighter regulatory measures (that included higher capital requirements) 
were taken and from 1999 to 2007 only three banks failed. 
Despite growing numbers in banking participants the industry was still highly concentrated in the 
1990s as Barclays Bank, Standard Chartered Bank and the Zambia National Commercial Bank 
maintained their market shares as consumers feared potential failure amongst the new banks. 
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 Only since the more stringent controls in 1999 did bank concentration begin to decline again as it 
had when the financial liberalisation had first been introduced. This is illustrated in Figure 3.4 
below. 
FIGURE 3.4: BANK CONCENTRATION IN ZAMBIA
 
Figure 3.4: Adapted from a New Database on Financial Development Structure 2007 (World Bank, 2009). (The vertical axis denotes the 
proportion of the market held by the three top firms while the horizontal axis presents the year)  
 
The trend in bank concentration in Zambia is one of general decline. Bank concentration fell 
from 81% in 1994 to 60% in 2007. As with Nigeria, the desire for financial sector development 
diluted bank concentration but came at the cost of greater instability in the banking sector. To 
compensate for this, the approach in Zambia was similar to the one that was later adopted in 
Nigeria in which bank capital requirements rose from US$20 000 to US$1.7 million in 
December 1996 and effectively forced banks to merge or face the possibility of getting their 
licences revoked (Zambia News Online, 1997). This served to bring stability to the level of 
concentration that hovered around 60% from 1999 to 2007. 
In all four countries bank concentration was changing as the desire for financial development in 
these African countries began with very liberal financial reforms that led to greater market 
participants and lower concentration levels but ultimately, due to failing banks, resulted in either 
an explicit or implicit desire for consolidation of the banking industries. The important question 
posed to researchers by this changing bank concentration is one of determining what its 
consequences are given the recent financial sector history of the African countries. 
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 3.4 BANK CONCENTRATION AND THE NET INTEREST RATE MARGIN 
One key implication of the Monti-Klein model discussed earlier is that bank market structure 
should be related to the net interest rate margin. This model added to the Structure Conduct 
Performance Hypothesis (SCP) and the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) suggests that 
interest rate margins between deposit and lending rates should vary with bank concentration. If 
the SCP holds then profit seeking by banks will result in higher margins as concentration rises, if 
the EMH holds then interest rate margins must fall as concentration increases. In both cases, 
regardless of the theory chosen, the suggestion is that bank concentration should be related to the 
net interest rate margin. (The graphs of bank concentration against the net interest rate margin 
are presented in Section H of the Appendix): 
In South Africa there is evidence that bank concentration is negatively associated with changes 
in the net interest margin. From 1994 to 1997 there is a positive relationship between them; 
where concentration rises the net interest margin falls and where concentration falls, the net 
interest margin rises. The same trend is identified from 2001 to 2004 where a similar relationship 
can also be seen. In evidence that not only suggests that bank concentration can be related to the 
net interest margin, and by extension the setting of bank lending and deposit rates, the 
relationship supports the assertion of the SCP that where concentration is increasing collusion 
will rise and net interest margins will increase to increase bank profits. 
In Botswana a similar relationship can also be seen with increasing concentration between 1995 
and 1997 being associated with increasing net interest margins and falling bank concentration 
from 1999 to 2001 being associated with falling net interest margins. This reinforces the support 
for the SCP provided by the South African data.  
Nigeria does not present a discernable pattern between the changing levels of bank concentration 
and the level of the net interest rate margin. However, while this does not mean that bank 
concentration is not related to the IRPT in Nigeria, it does indicate discord between the setting of 
bank lending and deposit rates and the banking sector concentration. 
Evidence from Zambia is not as strong as South Africa and Botswana but it does indicate that 
from 2001 to 2003 there is a positive relationship between bank concentration and the net 
interest margin. Over the period falling bank concentration is associated with falling net interest 
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 margins. This is yet more support not just for the presence of a relationship but that the 
relationship can be explained by the SCP.  
What the graphs indicate is some evidence that there is a relationship between bank 
concentration and the setting of bank lending and deposit rates. The relationship may not hold for 
all periods but it does provide support for the SCP. It also suggests that the IRPT should show 
evidence of a relationship with the level of concentration since the level of concentration appears 
to be associated with the setting of lending and deposit rates
34
. 
3.5 OFFICIAL/POLICY RATES AGAINST BANK LENDING AND DEPOSIT RATES  
At the core of this investigation is the relationship between official interest rates and bank 
lending and deposit rates which we have noted as the IRPT. While more formal tests are 
conducted to establish the long run relationships between them we present a preliminary analysis 
of their trend to see if they trend together and whether any variation in the trend can be explained 
by the level of bank concentration. (The graphs plotting official interest rates, bank lending and 
deposit rates in the four countries are in Section G of the Appendix). 
As illustrated, there is a clear positive trend for the policy, lending and deposit rates in South 
Africa suggesting a close relationship between these interest rates. In Botswana and Zambia the 
trend is clearest between the policy rate and the lending rate, while the trend with deposit rates is 
not as strong. Nigeria presents the weakest trend amongst the interest rates. While the general 
pattern of rates shows a positive relationship, like in the other countries, the movement is not as 
closely related. In the context of bank concentration the countries with the first and second 
highest level of concentration have the clearest trends while the countries with the lowest 
concentration in our sample do not display a similar clarity. The country with the lowest level of 
concentration presents the “poorest” evidence of a trend. 
These graphs do not actually present the strength and magnitude of the IRPT but they do show 
which countries exhibit the closest trends in the policy, lending and deposit rates and possibly 
which of them has the strongest IRPT. If the indication holds, then the EMH finds support as it is 
                                                            
34 This is an intuition in keeping with Wrightsman’s (1971: 202-203) point, discussed in the literature review, that 
since the IRPT falls down to the decisions by banks to set their lending and deposit rates, any indication that bank 
concentration affects those decisions suggests that bank concentration should play a factor in determining the speed 
and magnitude of the IRPT. 
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 the country with the lowest concentration that appears to have the poorest trend of policy rates, 
bank lending and deposit rates.  
However, it is important to note that this analysis does not actually reveal the strength of the 
IRPT. Rather it reveals that these rates tend to move together which has an important bearing on 
the policy implications of the results
35
.  
3.6 CONCLUSION 
This chapter provided a brief insight into monetary policy, bank concentration and the results we 
might receive from an empirical analysis of the four countries. However, this overview provided 
some intuitively unappealing evidence supporting both the SCP and the EMH as the true 
representation of the relationship between bank concentration and the IRPT. While the analyses 
conducted are not sufficient to answer the question posed by this study, they do reveal that 
policy, lending and deposit rates are generally trending together and that the bank concentration 
can be related to the setting of lending and deposit rates and consequently the IRPT. Additionally 
while there may be no clear congruence in the specific nature of the relationship between bank 
concentration and the IRPT in the sample countries, these preliminary analyses suggest that there 
is at least a relationship.  
Since a more thorough analysis is necessary before conclusions can be drawn as to whether a 
relationship truly exists between bank concentration and the IRPT and what the nature of that 
relationship is, the next chapter presents the methodology for testing the relationship in this 
study.  
 
 
                                                            
35 This is because even if this study finds evidence that the bank concentration negatively affects the strength of 
IRPT the fact that the rates trend together suggests that monetary policy can still be made effective. The only 
difference would relate to an increase in the time taken for changes in policy rates to be reflected in bank rates and a 
reduction in the size of the response of bank rates. Both these are elements that can be accounted for when setting 
the policy rates, for example, by setting rates well in advance of the desired changes in the bank lending and deposit 
rates and changing them by more than the desired change in the bank lending and deposit rates. Evidence of a slower 
and smaller IRPT is not necessarily evidence of doomed monetary policy. A clear illustration of this is that Nigerian 
monetary policy has been successful in achieving its goals of single digit inflation and positive economic growth 
despite having the poorest trend in our analysis.  
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 CHAPTER 4 
METHODOLOGY AND DATA DESCRIPTION 
4.1 INTRODUCTION  
Pursuant to the objectives of this study, as set out in Chapter 1, Chapter 3 presented the 
analytical framework used to investigate the relationship between banking sector concentration 
and the effectiveness of monetary policy via the IRPT. Additionally, as noted in the objectives of 
the study, the methodology will set out the framework for a thorough assessment of the IRPT 
with a view of comparing its strength or weakness with the level of banking sector concentration.  
The procedures set out below will be used for the investigation on both the levels of analysis 
identified in Chapter 1. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 discusses the empirical model. 
Section 4.3 covers the tests for stationarity. Section 4.4 examines the tests for cointegration. 
Section 4.5 discusses the symmetric and asymmetric error correction/equilibrium models. 
Section 4.6 deals with the mean adjustment lags. Section 4.7 discusses the symmetric and 
asymmetric magnitudes of adjustment. Section 4.8 shows how the IRPT is measured against 
bank concentration. Section 4.9 provides a description of the data used in the study and section 
4.10 concludes the chapter. 
4.2 THE EMPIRICAL MODEL 
To start, there must be a primary model that presents the relationship between the bank 
lending/deposit rates and the Central Bank rates in order to conduct an IRPT analysis. As 
discussed in the literature review, De Bondt (2002) presents a marginal cost pricing method for 
banks that links changes in bank rates to changes in official rates (see Equation 2.4). Taking this 
method as being reflective of the true relationship between bank rates and official rates, the IRPT 
can be represented by a relatively simple bi-variate linear expression which is presented in 
Equation 4.1. This expression of the IRPT is in keeping with other IRPT literature (c.f. 
Scholnick, 1996 and Aziakpono et al, 2007). 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡          (4.1) 
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 Where 𝑦𝑡  is the endogenously determined bank deposit/lending interest rate, 𝑥𝑡  is the policy/ 
Central Bank dictated rate, 𝛼𝑡  is the intercept,  𝛽1 is the slope parameter that shows the fraction 
of the change in official rates that is reflected in changes in the bank rates. For example, when 𝛽1 
is equal to 1 then the change in policy rates is fully reflected in bank rates, but when 𝛽1 is 0.5 
then only half the change in policy rates is reflected in bank lending and deposit rate changes. If 
the magnitude of IRPT adjustment changes then it is the size of 𝛽1that varies. If the speed of 
IRPT adjustment is slow then the time taken for 𝛽1 to be fully reflected in the bank lending and 
deposit rates is slow. The final component of the equation is 𝑢𝑡  which is a stochastic error term. 
Setting a model such as Equation 4.1 is useful for three reasons in this study
36
. Firstly, presenting 
the bank rates as endogenous and the Central Bank rates as exogenous in a bi-variate model 
informs the study as to which cointegration framework is most appropriate to test the presence of 
long run relationships between the variables. Secondly, it gives an indication of the error 
correction that will occur in the presence of cointegration. Thirdly, it provides a model for the 
computation of the long run and short run impact of Central Bank rate changes on bank lending 
and deposit rates.    
Once an appropriate model has been drawn it is imperative that the variables entering Equation 
4.1 are tested for stationarity to ensure that OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) estimations of the 
relationship between the bank and Central Bank rates are not spurious (Brooks, 2008: 319). The 
need for such stationarity tests is increased by the fact that the study uses time series data, which 
is usually not stationary (Gujarati, 1995: 806).  
4.3 TESTING FOR STATIONARITY 
Standard OLS estimation requires that the series used are stationary i.e. that they are of constant 
mean, variance and autocovariance. Such series are denoted as I(0) which means that they do not 
require differencing to bring about stationarity as they are stationary in level terms. Stationarity 
is important for three reasons: firstly, statistical inference is compromised by results of tests on 
non-stationary series because they often produce spurious regressions. In such cases two 
unrelated variables that are trending together could produce high R
2
 statistics and statistically 
significant coefficient estimates which seem to suggest that the variables are related even when 
                                                            
36 Each of these three points is fully explained in subsequent sections of this chapter. 
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 this is not actually the case. Secondly, valid hypothesis testing is impossible as the standard 
assumptions for asymptotic analysis are not valid. This is because the t-ratios will not follow a t-
distribution and the F-statistic will not follow an F-distribution. Thirdly, shocks to a particular 
variable in the system do not gradually die away as would be expected, rather they will be seen 
to persist or even grow in influence over time (Brooks, 2008: 319-320). It is because of the 
maladies of using non-stationary data that it is necessary to conduct tests to establish whether the 
series to be used in this research are stationary or not.  
There are different ways to test for stationarity: visual plots, autocorrelation functions, unit root 
tests and stationarity tests (Brooks, 2008). This study uses two popular tests. The first is a unit 
root test (ADF test) and the second is a stationarity test (KPSS test). Since the two tests are very 
common and have been extensively used in empirical literature, only a brief description is 
provided here. For a detailed description of stationarity and unit root tests see Brooks (2008: 
320). 
4.3.1 The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test  
The ADF test tests for stationarity in a series by determining whether or not a time series has a 
unit root or not. This test is conducted under the null hypothesis that there is a unit root in the 
series i.e. it has a null of non-stationarity. Despite its common use the ADF test suffers from a 
low power in determining stationarity or non-stationarity when a stationary process has a root 
close to the non-stationary boundary
37
. To help overcome the low power of the ADF test a 
stationarity test can also be used to compliment the unit root investigation.  
4.3.2 The Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (KPSS) test 
The KPSS test is a stationarity test with a null hypothesis of trend stationarity. It assesses 
stationarity based on the residuals from the OLS regression of the dependent variable on the 
explanatory variables for which it calculates an LM statistic which can be measured against 
KPSS critical values (Kwiatkwoski et al, 1992).  
                                                            
37 This happens because classical hypothesis testing does not accept the null hypothesis but rather rejects or fails to 
reject it. So a null hypothesis may fail to be rejected because it was correct or there was insufficient information for 
it to be rejected (Harris, 1995).  
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 Brooks (2008: 321) suggests the use of “confirmatory data” analysis in which the two tests are 
used together to ensure that conclusions regarding stationarity, or the lack thereof, are robust. 
This study uses both tests.  
4.3.3 Resolving the problem of Non-stationarity  
There are a few remedies that can be used to cope with the problem of stationarity. Firstly, 
stationarity can be induced in a non-stationary series by differencing it (taking and using the first 
differences of the series rather than the series in level terms). Although this brings about 
stationarity it does so at the risk of misspecification and the loss of long run information 
embedded in the data. However, where non-stationary variables are seen to be stationary when 
combined they can be used in regression analysis and statistical inference without differencing 
the series (Brooks, 2008).   
When a combination of non-stationary series I(d) results in a stationary process the series are 
said to be cointegrated. Generally, the linear combination of two non-stationary series will also 
be non-stationary and will be integrated at the same order of integration as the highest order of 
the non-stationary variables included in the system (Brooks, 2008). For example, two series of 
I(1) and I(2) will have a linear combination of I(2) which will also be non-stationary. It is only 
where the series are said to be cointegrated that a linear combination of I(1) and I(1) variables 
result in a I(0), process which is stationary (Brooks, 2008:318). Such a process has the benefit of 
allowing long run relationships between the variables to be investigated as long run dynamics 
imbedded in the data are not lost since the series are not differenced to make them stationary. 
Essentially, different series may be seen to exhibit a non-stationary trend but are cointegrated if 
they are trending together. 
Knowing that the existence of cointegration would allow a thorough investigation of long run 
relationships in time series data this study investigates the ways in which cointegrating 
relationships can be identified and used.  
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 4.4 TESTING FOR COINTEGRATION 
There are two prominent ways of establishing the existence of cointegration between series of 
non-stationary variables. The first is the Engle-Granger 2 step model and the second is the 
Johansen technique (Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990)).  
4.4.1 The 2 step Engle and Granger approach 
The Engle and Granger (1987) approach estimates a single cointegration regression equation 
using OLS and then tests its residuals for stationarity. It begins with the estimation of “the 
cointegrating regression” (Equation 4.2) which is an OLS estimation of the empirical model 
presented in Equation 4.1: 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡          (4.2) 
In this equation the variables are the same as in Equation 4.1 but in this cointegrating regression 
the residuals (𝑢𝑡) are obtained and tested for stationarity. If the residuals are I(0) then the bank 
rates and official rates series are cointegrated (Brooks, 2008: 321). Stationarity of the residuals is 
tested using the ADF test by estimating the following equation: 
∆𝑢t = 𝜓𝑢𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖
𝑝
𝑖=1 𝑖
∆𝑢𝑡−𝑖 + 𝜀𝑡        (4.3) 
The null hypothesis in these tests is still one of non-stationarity where H0: 𝜓 = 0: 𝑢t~𝐼(1) . This 
is to say that the null hypothesis is that there is a unit root present in the series. The alternative 
hypothesis is H1: 𝜓 < 0: 𝑢t~𝐼(0) which suggests that the series does not have a unit root and is 
thus stationary. From Equation 4.3 the absolute value of the calculated statistic is compared to 
the Mackinnon critical value. If the calculated statistic is less than the critical value then we fail 
to reject the null hypothesis (implying non-stationarity) (Chinzara and Aziakpono, 2009). 
Essentially, if the residuals are stationary the variables are cointegrated. If not, the variables may 
not be cointegrated or may be integrated at orders greater than 1
38
. 
It is important to note that while the cointegration test under the EG approach uses an ADF test 
similar to the one used in the stationarity analysis for the single time series there are three major 
                                                            
38 It is important to note that the EG approach requires all variables to be I(1). If they are not the residuals will be 
non-stationarity. Where the order of integration exceeds 1 then the estimation must be done on a model containing 
first differences (Brooks, 2002).  
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 differences. Firstly, the ADF equation for the cointegration analysis does not have an intercept 
term, which we would expect, since the OLS residuals are expected to be centred around zero. 
Secondly, the ADF critical values are replaced with Mackinnon critical values since the single 
series critical values of the ADF test are not appropriate for the residuals of the two series 
equation (Enders, 2004: 439). Thirdly, the critical values vary depending on the number of 
variables and observations in the sample being tested (Harris, 1995). In this study two sizes of 
sample periods for two variables are used (168 observations and 96 observations)
39
 and their 
corresponding critical values are: 1% (-3.954), 5% (-3.368), 10% (-3.067); 1% (-4.008), 5% (-
3.398), 10% (-0.3087) (Enders, 2004: 441). 
Despite providing a relatively simple cointegration framework the EG approach has been 
criticised for suffering from a finite sample problem that results in a lack of power in performing 
unit root and cointegration tests. It is also not possible to perform hypothesis tests about the 
actual cointegrating relationship
40
. Additionally critics of the EG framework note that it suffers 
from a simultaneous equation bias as it cannot allow for causality relationships that run in both 
directions. For example, in cases where y impacts on x and x impacts on y a researcher will be 
forced to treat the variables asymmetrically even though there may be no theoretical reason to do 
so. Should the researcher make an error in selecting which variable to make endogenous and 
which to make exogenous in the first stage (the OLS estimation) the error will be carried through 
to the cointegration stage (Brooks, 2008: 318-322).  
One important benefit provided by the EG approach is that in addition to the residual based test 
there is scope for the use of two additional tests to ensure that the results it finds are robust. 
These two tests are the Cointegrating Regression Durbin Watson (CRDW) test and the Error 
Correction Coefficient (ECM) test and they are described below. 
 
 
                                                            
39 These sample sizes reflect the entire sample period and the rolling window periods used in the two level analyses 
described earlier in this study. 
40 A revision of the EG approach, the Engle and Yoo (1987 in Harris, 1995) 3 step approach attempts to allow 
hypothesis testing by taking into consideration updated estimates of the cointegrating vector and its standard errors. 
Despite this the Johansen procedure is the technique that is generally taken as the alternative to the Engle and 
Granger approach. 
55
 4.4.1.1 Cointegrating Regression Durbin Watson (CRDW) test 
This test uses the potentially cointegrating regression Equation 4.2 and obtains the Durbin-
Watson (d) values. These d values are then compared to critical values under the hypotheses that 
d = 0 or d = 2. If the computed d statistic is greater than the critical values then the series in the 
potentially cointegrating regression are cointegrated. The critical values are: 1% (0.511), 5% 
(0.386), 10% (0.322) (Gujarati, 1995: 726). 
4.4.1.2 Error Correction Coefficient Significance 
If potentially cointegrating series have a statistically significant error correction then it can be 
presumed that the two series are cointegrated (Artis and Zhang, 1998: 5). This is clearly 
appreciated once it is seen that cointegration and error correction systems are complementary. If 
a stable long run relationship exists (i.e. series are cointegrated) there must be a system to restore 
their equilibrium relationship in the event of a disruption. Therefore, the existence of an error 
correction/equilibrium restoration system is evidence that a cointegrating relationship indeed 
exists.   
4.4.2 The Johansen Cointegration Technique 
The second tool for testing for cointegration is the Johansen technique. It is based on a maximum 
likelihood estimation of a vector autoregressive (VAR) system. It allows for the existence of 
more than one cointegrating relationship in the system. Additionally, and critically, it permits 
testing of hypotheses about the equilibrium relationships between variables. The use of the VAR 
model is particularly useful in cases where the endogeneity of variables is unknown. In such 
cases all variables are treated as endogenous in the VAR system and then one variable is 
normalised on in the final determination of the cointegrating vector. By doing this the Johansen 
technique overcomes the simultaneous equation bias (Enders, 2004).  
Additionally, it allows for not only the identification of the existence of cointegrating 
relationships but the number of relationships present as well. Furthermore, it allows hypothesis 
testing on the cointegrating relationships themselves allowing researchers to test the significance 
of individual variables in the cointegrating vector (Harris, 1995). 
56
 However, despite these benefits, this study does not use the Johansen technique as its 
cointegration framework and so it is not described in any further detail (see Section 4.4.3). A 
thorough explanation of the technique is available in Brooks (2008: 320-330). 
4.4.3 Cointegration framework selection 
This study motivates for the use of the simpler EG approach (with its two complementary tests) 
rather than the Johansen approach despite the growing use of the latter. This is because, firstly, in 
this study, the investigation will require that only two variables enter the cointegration 
framework (the policy determined rate and the deposit/lending rate) which means that there can 
be at most one stable long run relationship identified. This negates the need for the Johansen 
technique’s ability to identify multiple cointegrating vectors. Additionally, with only two 
variables the need to perform hypothesis tests to establish whether a variable should be included 
in the cointegrating equation is similarly nullified
41
.  
Secondly, as the policy rates are determined by a meeting of policy makers based on monetary 
policy targets there should be no simultaneous relationship between policy rates and bank rates. 
A priori, we would expect that policy rates can have an effect on deposit/lending rates but that 
the relationship will not run in the opposite direction. Consequently, this study will not be at risk 
of a simultaneous equation bias. This fact negates the use of the VAR system as suggested by 
Johansen, in which all variables are treated as endogenous and then only later separated into 
endogenous and exogenous variables by normalising the coefficient value of one of the variables.  
Thirdly, the comprehensive EG approach is in fact a combination of three tests for cointegration 
(the residual ADF test, the CRDW and error correction coefficient test) which should allow for 
robust conclusions as to whether cointegration exists or not.  
Fourthly, as Li (2003) points out, the Johansen technique is a statistical model rather than an 
economic one leaving it fraught with the danger of producing dubious results. This is illustrated 
on two counts. The first is that it is possible to receive results indicating two cointegrating 
relationships in a bi-variate analysis according to both Johansen’s trace and maximum 
                                                            
41 If cointegration is identified then both variables are part of the cointegrating equation. It is not possible for 
cointegration to exist and then to discover that cointegration still exists when one of the variables is excluded. In a 
multiple variable case the ability to test the relevance of a particular variable in the cointegration framework may be 
useful but in the two variable case it is unnecessary to do so. 
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 eigenvalues even when the maximum possible is one. The second is that it proposes a way to 
remove serial correlation through the lag length selection based on information criteria but fails 
to ensure that the results do not substitute the resolution of a statistical problem (auto-correlation) 
for an economic interpretability problem, as cautioned by Brooks, 2008: 157)
42
. Finally, on the 
point of a lack of power in small samples, the Johansen technique still suffers from the same 
problem as the EG approach. Ultimately while the Johansen technique is an invaluable tool in 
multi-variate analyses in which its ability to identify multiple cointegrating vectors, allow 
hypothesis testing on the cointegrating relationships and cope with situations in which the 
endogeneity or exogeneity of variables is unknown its benefits are not necessarily applicable in 
this two variable analysis. 
With no need to identify more than one cointegrating relationship and no economic theory 
related reason to worry about the possibility of a simultaneous equation bias, this two variable 
investigation opts for the simpler Engle and Granger approach (complete with its two additional 
tests). This is in line with interest rate pass through studies around the world (c.f. Patnaik and 
Vasudevan (1997); Aziakpono et al. (2007); Wang (2008)).  
Once the existence of cointegrating relationships is established an error correction framework is 
used to establish the short run dynamics of the relationships between the variables. This is made 
possible by the error correction framework that allows the disentangling of the long run co-
movement of the variables from the short-run adjustment towards their equilibrium (Van 
Leuvensteijn et al., 2008: 16). 
4.5 THE ERROR CORRECTION/EQUILIBRIUM MODEL  
In this study the error correction represents how much the bank lending and deposit rates adjust 
in a month to return to their stable long run equilibrium levels after a change in the Central Bank 
rate. Based on the empirical model presented in Section 4.2 the error correction model can be 
presented as: 
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1∆𝑥𝑡 + 𝛽2(𝑦𝑡−1 − 𝛾𝑥𝑡−1) + 𝜀𝑡       (4.4) 
                                                            
42 In a model of few variables there is a strong chance that the model will suffer from serial correlation however as 
cautioned by Brooks (2008, 150-161) attempting to resolve the problem requires the inclusion of additional 
variables which may mean that the model fails to capture the relationship it was intended to address. Much of the 
empirical literature similarly does not attempt to remove serial correlation in the bi-variate analysis. 
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 Where  𝑦𝑡−1 − 𝛾𝑥𝑡−1 = 𝑢𝑡  is the error correction term which is a series of the residuals 
obtained form the cointegrating Equation 4.2, 𝛾 is the cointegrating coefficient whose existence 
means that statistical inference and OLS use is possible as stationarity concerns are negated, 𝜀𝑡  is 
a white noise error term and 𝛽2 is the coefficient of the error correction term. If 𝛽2 is negative 
and statistically significant then it can be said that market forces are in operation to restore long 
run equilibrium following a short run disturbance (Aziakpono et al, 2007). According to the 
Granger Representation Theorem the existence of a statistically significant error correction 
points to the existence of cointegration hence the use of the error correction statistic (𝛽2) to test 
for cointegration (Enders, 2004). 
Once an error correction is calculated it is possible to ascertain the speed at which the bank rates 
adjust back to equilibrium after a change in official rates. This is done by computing mean 
adjustment lags which, in the context of the study, can be interpreted as indicating the speed of 
the IRPT. 
4.6 MEAN ADJUSTMENT LAGS (MAL) 
Where the error correction showed the adjustment within a month towards equilibrium the 
MALs show the total time taken to return to equilibrium. Following Doornik and Hendry (1994), 
the MAL is calculated from Equation 4.4 as follows: 
𝑀𝐿 = (1 − 𝛽1)/ 𝛽2         (4.5) 
In the case of monthly data the MAL presents how many months it takes for the change in 
Central Bank rates to be fully
43
 reflected in bank lending and deposit rates. If the mean 
adjustment lag is high, then there is a high rigidity/slow adjustment in the response of bank rates 
to policy rate changes. The opposite would be true with a low mean adjustment lag suggesting 
low rigidity/fast adjustment of bank rates to policy rate changes. 
These MALs are more correctly described as symmetric MALs as they reflect the response of 
bank rates whether they are above or below their equilibrium level. There is a way to compute 
the asymmetric response of bank rates to Central Bank rate changes. These asymmetric lags 
                                                            
43 The word “fully” refers to the complete LR impact rather than a full reflection of the change in the Central Bank 
rate. I.e. if LR adjustment is only 80% then the MAL shows how long after the initial response in the bank rate does 
it take for the full 80% response to be reflected. 
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 would show how long it takes bank rates to adjust up to equilibrium and down to equilibrium. 
These asymmetric MALs would effectively show how fast bank rates adjust upwards and 
downwards. 
4.6.1 Asymmetric Mean Adjustment Lags 
To determine the asymmetric effects Scholnik (1996) suggests the separation of the residuals 
(𝑢𝑡) (here marked as 𝑅) from the cointegrating equation into two series 𝑅
+ and 𝑅−, where: 
𝑅+ = 𝑅,           𝑖𝑓    𝑅 > 𝜇 
𝑅+ = 0,           𝑖𝑓    𝑅 < 𝜇 
and 
𝑅− = 𝑅,           𝑖𝑓    𝑅 < 𝜇 
𝑅− = 0,           𝑖𝑓    𝑅 > 𝜇 
Where 𝜇 is the mean of the error correction which is equal to zero since it is the residual series of 
the cointegrating equation. When a residual is above its mean it can be interpreted as the bank 
lending/deposit rates being above their equilibrium level with the policy rates and consequently 
expected to move down to equilibrium.  
Conversely, when the residual is below its mean it can be interpreted as the bank lending/deposit 
rates being below their equilibrium level with policy rates and consequently expected to move 
back up to equilibrium. By splitting the residuals it is now possible to observe the speed of 
adjustment up or down for lending and deposit rates after Central Bank rate changes. 
Once the residuals are split into two series an asymmetric error correction system is calculated 
from which the asymmetric MALs can be calculated. This asymmetric error correction equation 
is presented as follows: 
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1∆𝑥𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑅𝑡−1
+ + 𝛽3𝑅𝑡−1
− + 𝑢𝑡       (4.6) 
The relevant asymmetric mean adjustment lags become: 
𝑀𝐿+ = (1 − 𝛽1)/ 𝛽2         (4.7) 
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 and  
𝑀𝐿− = (1 − 𝛽1)/ 𝛽3         (4.8) 
The mean adjustment lags in Equations 4.7 and 4.8  show the asymmetric adjustment in bank 
lending and deposit rates when they are above (Equation 4.7) and below (Equation 4.8) 
equilibrium. If the mean lags are different then the adjustments of the bank rates can be seen to 
be different.  
However, whether or not true asymmetry exists requires the use of the Wald test with a 𝜒2 (1) 
distribution on the restriction that Equations 4.7 and 4.8 are in fact equal
44
. If the Wald test 
reveals asymmetric responses when residuals are above equilibrium (and bank rates are pushed 
to move down) and when residuals are below equilibrium (and bank rates are pushed to move 
up) then it can be concluded that bank rates will adjust differently during periods of 
expansionary monetary policy, when bank rates are expected to rise, and contractionary 
monetary policy when bank rates are expected to fall.  
Since the IRPT is measured by both the speed and magnitude of the adjustment of bank rates in 
response to Central Bank rate changes the next section describes how this study calculates the 
magnitude of the long run and short run adjustments and the asymmetries of those adjustments. 
4.7 SYMMETRIC AND ASYMMETRIC MAGNITUDE OF ADJUSTMENT 
As noted earlier, OLS estimation is spurious in cases where non-stationary series are used but is 
not spurious if the series are cointegrated. In cases where cointegration is found to be present the 
OLS estimators are actually “super consistent” allowing conventional OLS estimation to obtain 
the long run (LR) run impact from running a simple regression of the bank rates and the Central 
Bank rates (as in Equation 4.2) (Harris, 1995 and Enders, 2004)  
The short run (SR) impact can be computed from running the same equation but in first 
differences. This equation is presented below: 
                                                            
44 The Wald test works on the null that the coefficients of the asymmetric error correction terms (𝑅+ and  𝑅− in 
Equation 4.6) are not statistically different from zero. Rejecting this null suggests that the responses of bank rates to 
impulses to move down equilibrium and up  to equilibrium are in fact asymmetric. 
 
61
 ∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1∆𝑥𝑡 + 𝑢𝑡         (4.9) 
Of importance to note here is that in cases where no cointegration is found short run adjustments 
can still be computed provided that the series are I(1). This is because differencing the series 
would leave them stationary and allow OLS estimation to produce non-spurious results. The 
forfeiture of long run information embedded in the data through the differencing would not be a 
concern in the computation of the SR parameters. 
The calculation of the short run asymmetric magnitude of adjustment requires that the changes in 
the Central Bank rate (∆𝑥𝑡) are separated into increases and decreases in the same way the 
residuals of the cointegrating regression were split to compute asymmetric error correction 
statistics from which the asymmetric MALs are computed. Following Kwapil and Scharler 
(2009) the SR asymmetric equation becomes: 
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1∆𝑥𝑡
+ + 𝛽2∆𝑥𝑡
− + 𝑢𝑡        (4.10) 
Where ∆𝑥𝑡
+ represents increases in the official rates and ∆𝑥𝑡
− represents decreases in the official 
rates. Here again asymmetry is confirmed where the Wald test on 𝛽1 and 𝛽2 shows that they are 
statistically different from zero. 
The long run asymmetric response has generally not been investigated as it could not be 
computed in the same way as SR asymmetries because while the differencing of the series made 
them stationary it removed LR information embedded in the data. In this study however, in the 
case of the LR asymmetry we use Kwapil and Scharler (2009: 8) who provide an innovative way 
to compute LR asymmetries from series in 1
st
 differences.  
They propose the splitting of the changes in the bank rates (as in the SR approach above) but 
suggest the calculation of an Autoregressive Distributed Lag model rather than the simple 
expression used to compute the SR impact. This means that the following equation is calculated:  
∆𝑦𝑡 = 𝛼0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=0 ∆𝑥𝑡−𝑖
+ + ∑ 𝛼𝑞∆𝑥𝑡−𝑞
−𝑝
𝑞=0 + ∑ 𝛼𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1 ∆𝑦𝑡−𝑗    (4.11) 
Where n, p and m denote the maximum number of lags chosen based on the Akaike Information 
Criterion. The asymmetric long run impact is then calculated as follows:  
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 LR+ (LR adjustment for increase in Central Bank rates) = (∑ 𝛼𝑖)/
𝑛
𝑖=0 (∑ 𝛼𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1 ) (4.12) 
LR- (LR adjustment for decrease in Central Bank rates) = (∑ 𝛼𝑞)/
𝑝
𝑞=0 (∑ 𝛼𝑗
𝑚
𝑗=1 ) (4.13) 
It should be noted that in cases where no cointegration is found the LR adjustment can still be 
computed from an equation such as Equation 4.11, except that in the symmetric adjustment the 
changes in the Central Bank rates are not split. 
Once the LR and SR symmetric and asymmetric magnitude of adjustment are computed, their 
changes can be compared to the changes in the banking sector to investigate the possibility of a 
relationship between bank concentration and the size of the IRPT.  
4.8 MEASURING INTEREST RATE PASS THROUGH AGAINST BANK CONCENTRATION 
In order to merge the annually computed measures of banking sector concentration and the 
monthly data used in the IRPT analysis, this study will partially follow Demirgüç-Kunt et al. 
(2003) where an average of the level of concentration for a given period is taken and a 
corresponding IRPT determined. In this study, each of the four countries will have a measure of 
the average banking sector concentration (and its IRPT) for the entire sample period as well as 
average banking concentration measures for 8 year rolling windows (and their IRPTs). This 
means that the final analysis will be done on 32 sample periods each of at least an 8 year period 
complete with a measure of the IRPT as described in Sections 4.2 to 4.7 and a corresponding 
level of CR3 concentration. In reporting the results the results will be presented on two levels. 
The first will present the analysis across the countries in which the average concentration level 
for the entire sample period is matched to the corresponding speed and magnitude of the IRPT 
and the results compared between the four countries. The second is a rolling window analysis in 
which the changes in bank concentration are compared to their corresponding changes in the 
speed and magnitude of the IRPT.  
Throughout the study the leading question is whether there is a distinct relationship between 
banking concentration changes and the strengthening/weakening of the IRPT. Once the 
strength/weakness of the IPRT is determined for the various periods then conclusions can be 
drawn as to the nature of the relationship between bank concentration and the IRPT. 
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 If, for example,  increasing levels of bank concentration are characterised by a weakening IRPT, 
as the Structure-Conduct-Performance hypothesis suggests, then it can be argued that a trade-off 
exists between bank concentration (and its benefits of easier bank regulation and insulation in 
financial crises) and effective monetary policy. If such a relationship does not exist then policy 
makers can simultaneously engage in effective monetary policy while permitting increased bank 
concentration. 
4.9 DATA DESCRIPTION 
This study uses monthly data on Central Bank/policy interest rates, average lending rates and 
deposit rates. It uses the annual 3 firm banking concentration ratio (CR3) in South Africa (RSA) 
Botswana (BOTS), Nigeria (NIG) and Zambia (ZAM) from 1994 to 2007. The countries and 
sample periods were selected primarily according to data availability. The data is largely sourced 
from the IMF International Financial Statistics (IFS) CD ROM 2009, Central Bank Reports and 
the New Database on Financial Development and Structure 2007 (Beck et al, 2007 and World 
Bank, 2009) 
4.10 CONCLUSION 
This chapter set out the empirical framework used in this study’s investigation of the relationship 
between bank concentration and the IRPT. It outlined the importance of stationarity and the 
confirmatory data analysis approach to be used in this study. The different methods of 
cointegration were discussed and the most appropriate method for the study identified, and its 
use justified. The chapter then identified how the symmetric and asymmetric speeds of 
adjustments are calculated from an error correction framework and how the long and short run 
symmetric and asymmetric magnitudes of adjustments are computed. Finally it described the 
data used in the study and how the analysis of results is conducted. The next chapter presents the 
empirical results of these tests.  
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 CHAPTER 5 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Having set the empirical framework and described the methods that will be used in this analysis, 
in this chapter we now present and discuss the empirical results. Thereafter, the conclusions and 
policy implications of the study are presented in Chapter 6. 
As indicated in Chapter 4, the results are presented at two levels. We first present the results for 
the entire period for each country and compare them across the four countries. The second level 
presents the results for the eight year rolling windows in each country to see if changes in IRPT 
can be related to changes in the level of bank concentration. This chapter will be organized as 
follows: Section 5.2 presents stationarity and unit root test results, Section 5.3 deals with 
cointegration results, Section 5.4 presents symmetric error correction and asymmetric error 
correction results, Section 5.5 covers symmetric and asymmetric mean adjustment lag results, 
Section 5.6 presents symmetric and asymmetric magnitude of adjustment results and Section 5.7 
concludes the empirical results. Each section will present the results on the two levels. 
5.2 STATIONARITY AND UNIT ROOT TESTS 
As noted in the previous chapter the two tests to be used to determine the stationarity and level of 
integration of the series of interest rates are the ADF and KPSS tests. These tests were conducted 
under both the intercept and “trend and intercept” assumptions and the results were not 
significantly different
45. The results under the “trend and intercept” assumption are presented in 
Tables A1 to A4 of the Appendix.   
5.2.1 Analysis for the entire period 
In all four countries the deposit, lending and policy rates are at least stationary at first differences 
(I(1)) for both the ADF and KPSS tests. In some cases the series are stationary at level but this is 
                                                            
45 The choice of which assumption to use was informed by visual plots of the data as suggested by Brooks (2008). 
However, as Table I of the Appendix shows, there is no evidence either against or in favour of a trend in each of the 
series. As a result the choice is not immediately apparent in the graphs. The tests were then conducted under both 
intercept and “intercept and trend” assumptions and both assumptions yielded similar results regarding the 
stationarity and level of integration of the series. 
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 not a cause for concern as the cointegration framework used in this study requires that the 
underlying series are stationarity at least at first differences. Similarly, the OLS estimation of 
magnitude of adjustment parameters is also reliant on the variables being at least I(1).  
5.2.2 Rolling Window Analysis 
The results of the ADF and KPSS tests show that all the series in all the sample periods are 
stationary at first differences. There are periods in which the series are stationary at level but for 
reasons noted above this is not a cause for concern. As the series are all at least I(1) they are 
investigated for cointegration. 
5.3 COINTEGRATION TESTS
46
 
The results for the Engle and Granger ADF test, Cointegration Regression Durbin Watson test 
(CRDW) and the Error Correction Model coefficient test (ECM) are presented in Appendix B. 
The procedure in deciding if series are cointegrated when multiple tests are used follows 
Kremers (1992) which suggests that cointegration can be said to be present should one of the 
tests confirm cointegration at at least a 5% level of significance or at least two of the tests 
confirm cointegration at a 10% level of significance. In all the cointegration tests the test is 
between the deposit rates and the policy rates and the lending rates and the policy rates. 
5.3.1 Analysis for the entire period 
The results, presented in Table 5.1 below, show strong evidence of cointegration in South Africa 
and Zambia where all the tests identify cointegration at at least 5% for both lending and deposit 
rates. In the case of Nigeria deposit and lending rate cointegration is confirmed by only two of 
the tests. Botswana has the weakest evidence of cointegration for both lending and deposit rates 
and the cointegration is only identified by the ECM coefficient test. Particularly, noticeable in 
the results is that the coefficient of the ECM strongly confirms the presence of cointegration in 
all the countries for both lending and deposit rates at a 1% level of significance. This is 
significant given Artis & Zhang (1998: 5) assertion that the ECM statistic for testing 
cointegration can generate more powerful tests than those based on the ADF and CRDW 
                                                            
46 All the cointegration tests are between the deposit rates and the bank rates and the lending rates and the bank 
rates. 
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 statistics. For this reason the results still demonstrate strong evidence of cointegration even 
where the ECM test is the only one to confirm its presence. 
TABLE. 5.1  CR3 concentration and the presence of cointegration 
Conc. Rank Conc. Level Country Period Bank Rate ADF Test CRDW ECM Coefficient 
1 
0.91 BOTS 1994-2007 Deposit -1.819 0.137 -0.347* 
0.91 BOTS 1994-2007 Lending -2.484 0.302 -0.353* 
2 
0.88 RSA 1994-2007 Deposit -3.443** 0.498** -0.361* 
0.88 RSA 1994-2007 Lending -4.744* 0.793* -0.435* 
3 
0.71 ZAM 1994-2007 Deposit -3.865** 0.483** -0.334* 
0.71 ZAM 1994-2007 Lending -5.451* 0.920* -0.462* 
4 
0.67 NIG 1994-2007 Deposit -3.423** 0.319 -0.392* 
0.67 NIG 1994-2007 Lending -2.948 0.448** -0.400* 
ADF McKinnon Critical values 2 variables ~ 100 observations: 1% (-4.008), 5% (-3.398), 10% (-0.3087) (Enders, 2004: 441) 
ADF McKinnon Critical values 2 variables ~ 200 observations: 1% (-3.954), 5% (-3.368), 10% (-3.067) (Enders, 2004: 441) 
CRDW critical values: 1% (0.511), 5% (0.386), 10% (0.322) (Gujarati, 1995: 726) 
Key:  Significant at 1% (*), 5% (**), 10% (***) 
 
What is important to note is that cointegration is confirmed in all the countries regardless of the 
level of bank concentration. This is illustrated most clearly in Table 5.1 by the highly significant 
ECM coefficients in all four countries for both lending and deposit rates. This is noteworthy 
because cointegration is a measure of the long run relatedness of different time series, and to 
confirm its presence, in all the countries, despite differing levels of bank concentration, is to 
confirm that long run relationships can exist between policy and bank lending and deposit rates 
regardless of the level of bank concentration i.e. bank concentration does not appear to influence 
whether the series are related. 
While this result cannot tell us whether bank concentration influences the strength of the 
relationship between the lending/deposit rates and the policy rates it does suggest that bank 
concentration may not be a factor in the presence of a relationship between policy and bank 
lending/deposit rates, and by extension the IRPT. 
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 5.3.2 Rolling Window Analysis 
In these results (see Section B of Appendix), there is cointegration for both South African 
deposit and lending rates in all sample periods except 2000-2007(3)
47
. In all the periods where 
cointegration is found the finding is robust as at least two tests confirm its presence at the 5% 
level. This is with the exception of the deposit rate 1999-2006 (1) where only the CRDW test 
confirms cointegration at 5% while the ADF test confirms it only at 10%.  
In the case of Botswana, all lending rates are cointegrated with Central Bank rates. The same is 
not true for deposit rates where there are four periods in which deposit rates are not cointegrated 
with Central Bank rates 1996-2003(3), 1997-2004 (4), 1999-2006(6), 2000-2007(7). In the cases 
where cointegration is found it is confirmed by at least two of the three tests. 
In Nigeria, in contrast to Botswana, all deposit rates are cointegrated with Central Bank rates but 
not all lending rates are cointegrated with policy rates. Lending rates are not cointegrated with 
Central Bank rates in the following periods: 1995-2002(4), 1996-2003(5), 1997-2004(6), 1998-
2005(7), and 1999-2006(8). As with Botswana, where cointegration is found the results are 
robust and are confirmed by at least two of the tests.   
Zambia is the only country in which the lending and deposit rates show evidence of stable long 
run relationships with the Central Bank rates in all the rolling windows. The results are also 
robust here and are confirmed by at least two of the tests for each period.  
5.3.2.1 Cointegration vs. Bank Concentration 
While the results for the individual countries are presented separately in Tables B1 to B4 in the 
Appendix, Table B5 presents a summary table of cointegration results for all the countries 
identifying which rolling window periods reveal cointegrating relationships. 
One of the key revelations in the search for cointegration is that there is no distinct and 
consistent relationship between CR3 concentration and the existence of a stable long run 
relationship (cointegration) between bank rates and the Central Bank rates. For example, as 
                                                            
47 In all cases the number next to the sample period denotes its level of concentration relative to the other rolling 
window sample periods for the country.  (1) denotes the most concentrated period and (7) the least concentrated 
period according to the CR3 measure of concentration.  
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 noted above, there is a lack of cointegration in the most concentrated periods in RSA while it is 
least concentrated periods that do not present evidence of cointegration in Botswana and Nigeria.   
Additionally, comparing CR3 concentration in all the rolling windows with the presence of 
cointegration provides similarly ambiguous results for the relationship between bank 
concentration and the presence of cointegration. While it is true that in the case of deposit rates, 
evidence against the presence of a cointegrating relationship is found only in periods when 
concentration is high, the relationship is still not distinct. 
The fact that there is no distinct relationship between CR3 concentration and the existence of a 
stable long run relationship between deposit/lending rates and Central Bank rates may be 
explained by considering the reasonable possibility that the existence of such cointegrating 
relationships would hinge on more than just the level of bank concentration. In line with 
empirical evidence, other factors such as the ownership of the banks, legislation and bank 
supervision may determine whether there is a long run relationship between policy rates and 
bank lending and deposit rates (c.f Allen and Gale, 2003). 
What the analysis on the two levels suggests is that bank concentration may not be an influence 
in the relationship between bank and Central Bank rates. Put differently, whether or not bank 
lending/deposit rates and Central Bank rates move together appears to be independent of the 
level of banking sector concentration. However, more scrutiny is necessary before a 
comprehensive conclusion can be drawn. 
Following on from the cointegration analysis this study estimates the error correction mechanism 
from which the speed of the adjustment of deposit and lending rates to Central Banks rate 
changes is calculated.   
5.4 ERROR CORRECTION MODEL 
5.4.1 Analysis for the entire period 
The error correction results for the first level of the analysis are in Table 5.2. In each case the 
symmetric error correction is computed and then an asymmetric error correction is also estimated 
to separate the error correction mechanism between periods when bank rates are above and 
below equilibrium.  
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 TABLE. 5.2  CR3 concentration and the presence of cointegration 
Conc. Rank Conc. Level Country Period Bank Rate ECt-1 EC
+
t-1 EC
-
t-1 
1 
0.91 BOTS 1994-2007 Deposit -0.347* -0.891* 0.079 
0.91 BOTS 1994-2007 Lending -0.353* -0.272** -0.414 
2 
0.88 RSA 1994-2007 Deposit -0.361* -0.322* -0.419* 
0.88 RSA 1994-2007 Lending -0.435* 0.206 -0.798* 
3 
0.71 ZAM 1994-2007 Deposit -0.334* -0.306* -0.369* 
0.71 ZAM 1994-2007 Lending -0.462* -0.169 -0.663 
4 
0.67 NIG 1994-2007 Deposit -0.392* -0.726* -0.133 
0.67 NIG 1994-2007 Lending -0.400* -0.536* -0.252** 
Key:  Significant at 1% (*), 5% (**), 10% (***), no asterix is shown on results that are not significant 
ECt-1 is the coefficient of the symmetric error correction; EC
-
t-1 is the coefficient of the asymmetric error correction for adjustments up to 
equilibrium; EC+t-1 is the coefficient of the asymmetric error correction for adjustments down to equilibrium 
 
In all four countries symmetric error correction for both lending and deposit rates is significant 
as shown by the fact that all ECt-1 values are significant at the 1% level. In addition lending rates 
adjust faster than deposit rates suggesting a greater reluctance for banks to adjust deposit rates 
than lending rates. However, since this is true in all cases, regardless of the level of bank 
concentration we can see that whether or not the lending rate adjustments are faster than deposit 
rate adjustments is not related to the level of concentration. This result is in keeping with the 
intuition that since lending rates represent returns on assets (loans) and deposit rates, expenditure 
on liabilities (deposits), banks would adjust lending rates faster than they would deposit rates 
regardless of the level of concentration. In addition, it can be seen that the speed of adjustment is 
not related to the level of concentration. For example, Botswana with the greatest concentration 
has the slowest adjustment of lending rates while Nigeria has the least concentrated banking 
industry and the third slowest adjustment of lending rates.  
In all the cases where both asymmetric results were significant for deposit rates, adjustments 
down were slower than deposit rate adjustments up. While this provides support for the Adverse 
Consumer Reaction hypothesis, the results do not provide sufficient evidence to suggest that the 
presence of the relationship is influenced by the level of bank concentration. 
5.4.2 Rolling Window Analysis 
The results for the estimated symmetric and asymmetric rolling window error correction are 
presented in Appendix C. As expected, in all periods in which no cointegration is identified, and 
the error correction is computed to perform the ECM coefficient test, there is no statistically 
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 significant error correction both symmetrically and asymmetrically. For example, in Botswana 
for the periods 1999-2006 and 2000-2007 there is no evidence of cointegration and the 
corresponding ECM values are not significant (see Section B of Appendix). However, in so far 
as the symmetric adjustment is concerned there are some intuitively unappealing results in which 
cointegration is identified and yet the corresponding error correction is not significant.  In the 
symmetric error correction this is the case for South Africa 1999-2006(1) Botswana’s deposit 
rate 1998-2005(7) and lending rates 1995-2002(4), 1997-2004(6) and Zambia’s deposit rate 
1998-2005(7). According to Gonzalo and Lee (2000), it is possible to observe such a conflicting 
outcome in cases where the underlying series are fractionally integrated. In such cases the series 
are not actually I(1) as identified by the stationarity/unit root tests. Consequently, the 
cointegration results on such series are in fact spurious. In all cases, however, there is no pattern 
between the changes in the bank concentration and the size or significance of the symmetric 
error correction. 
In terms of the asymmetric error correction, there are fewer periods in which both the 
asymmetric error correction terms are significant than periods in which at least one of them is not 
significant (see Tables C1 to C4). Neither in the size nor significance of the positive (EC
+
t-1) and 
negative error correction (EC
-
t-1) is there a clear relationship between bank concentration and the 
error correction mechanism of the cointegrated series.  
However, as noted in Chapter 4, the study computes mean adjustment lags to assess how long the 
adjustment to equilibrium takes in cases where the error correction is significant. Moreover, the 
Wald
48
 test results (attached to the mean adjustment lag results in Tables D-1 to D-4) suggest 
that where both the positive and negative asymmetric error corrections are significant there is 
support for the hypothesis that they are statistically different. However, as can be seen in the 
tables, the presence or lack of asymmetry is not related to the level of bank concentration. This is 
clear where South Africa and Zambia have significant lending rate asymmetry in their most 
concentrated and least concentrated periods. Similarly, in Botswana and Nigeria in the few cases 
in which the asymmetric error corrections are significant, there is not a pattern between the 
presence of asymmetry and the level of bank concentration. This all suggests that whether or not 
                                                            
48 Since each asymmetric error correction term has a corresponding asymmetric MAL, finding evidence of 
asymmetry in the error correction is to find asymmetry in the corresponding MAL. 
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 the speed of adjustment of deposit and lending rates is characterised by asymmetry in 
adjustments up and down is not related to the level of bank concentration. 
5.5 MEAN ADJUSTMENT LAGS
49
 
While the error correction coefficients show by how much bank rates adjust back to equilibrium 
in each month, they do not show how long the complete adjustment will take. To determine the 
speed of the adjustment of the bank rates to Central Bank rate changes the study computes the 
mean adjustment lags as described in the Chapter 4. The full results are presented in Section D of 
the Appendix. 
5.5.1 Analysis for the entire period 
In this analysis the study compares the symmetric mean adjustment and asymmetric mean 
adjustment to the average level of concentration in each of the four countries over the entire 
sample period as presented in Table 5.3. 
MAL: Symmetric Mean Adjustment Lag 
MAL+: Mean Adjustment Lag when the bank rate is above its equilibrium with the official rate and the impulse is for bank rates to fall 
MAL-: Mean Adjustment Lag when the bank rate is below its equilibrium with the official rate and the impulse is for bank rates to rise 
*Only the MAL of significant error corrections are reported in this table (for full set of results see Appendix Tables C1 to C4 and D1 to D4) 
As can be seen in Table 5.3 above, Botswana has the highest level of concentration and the 
largest symmetric MAL/slowest adjustment for both deposit and lending rates. After a shock to 
the equilibrium relationship it takes on average 2.6 months (approximately 78 days) and 1.7 
months (approximately 50 days) for deposit rates and lending rates to return to equilibrium.  It 
follows that for a discernable relationship to be seen between bank concentration and the speed 
                                                            
 
 
TABLE. 5.3  CR3 concentration and speed of adjustments across the countries 
Conc. Rank Conc. Level Country Period Bank Rate MAL  MAL+ MAL- 
1 
0.91 BOTS 1994-2007 Deposit 2.594 0.961 - 
0.91 BOTS 1994-2007 Lending 1.665 2.175 1.428 
2 
0.88 RSA 1994-2007 Deposit 0.633 0.708 0.545 
0.88 RSA 1994-2007 Lending 0.413 - 0.263 
3 
0.71 ZAM 1994-2007 Deposit 0.700 0.765 0.635 
0.71 ZAM 1994-2007 Lending 0.492 - - 
4 
0.67 NIG 1994-2007 Deposit 1.380 0.751 - 
0.67 NIG 1994-2007 Lending 0.732 0.548 1.168 
72
 of adjustment, the country with the lowest concentration must have the fastest symmetric 
adjustment/lowest MAL. However, despite having the lowest level of concentration Nigeria does 
not have the smallest MALs. The fastest adjustment for both deposit and lending rates occurs in 
South Africa where despite having the second highest level of concentration it takes 0.7 months 
(approximately 19 days) and 0.5 months (approximately 13 days) for deposit rates and lending 
rates to return to equilibrium. This analysis does not show a relationship between the level of 
concentration and the symmetric adjustment of bank lending/deposit rates to Central Bank rate 
changes.  
In the case of the asymmetric adjustment, there is a negative relationship between the adjustment 
down to equilibrium in lending rates and the level of banking concentration. Botswana, with the 
most concentrated banking sector, has the slowest adjustment of lending rates followed by 
Zambia and then Nigeria, which has the least concentrated banking sector. This suggests that the 
more concentrated the banking industry the slower the speed in the reduction of lending rates 
back to equilibrium. This is evidence in support of the Structure Conduct Hypothesis which 
suggests that concentrated markets are susceptible to collusion which would slow down profit 
reducing reductions in lending rates. This evidence supports the findings of Corvoisier and 
Gropp (2002) which also identify evidence in support of the SCP in the banking industries of EU 
countries. However, some caution is necessary in drawing conclusions on these results as this 
relationship exists in the absence of a significant MAL+ for South Africa, which had the fastest 
symmetric adjustment. 
The downward adjustment of deposits (MAL+) and the upward adjustment of both lending and 
deposit rates (MAL-) do not show a relationship between bank concentration and the speed of 
adjustment. This is illustrated in Table 5.3 by the fact the increasing bank concentration is not 
associated with either an increase or decrease in the mean adjustment lags. Using the Wald test, 
the null hypothesis that there is no asymmetry is rejected in all the countries for both lending and 
deposit rates (see Appendix Tables D1 to D4). As a result it can be seen that asymmetry exists 
between the response of bank rates to impulses to rise or fall to equilibrium. However, since the 
asymmetry is present in all the countries it is, at least according to the first level of analysis, not 
related to the level of bank concentration. 
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 5.5.2 Rolling Window Analysis
50
 
As shown in Table D1, South Africa does not present evidence of a clear relationship between 
changing bank concentration and either a slower or faster symmetric speed of adjustment. For 
the same reason as the analysis of the entire period, no relationship is observable as increasing 
bank concentration is not clearly associated with increases or decreases in the mean adjustment 
lags
51
. The result is the same for adjustments up to equilibrium (MAL+) and adjustments down 
to equilibrium (MAL-). However, as may be expected, the impulses for profit boosting increases 
in lending rates are faster than the impulses to reduce them. Of interest in the case of South 
Africa is that deposit rates adjust faster to impulses to increase than decrease providing support 
for the adverse consumer reaction hypothesis. However, again, while some support for this 
theory may exist, there is still no evidence of a relationship between both the symmetric and 
asymmetric speed of adjustment and the level of bank concentration.  
In Botswana the symmetric adjustments are larger than in South Africa suggesting that both 
lending and deposit rates adjusted more slowly in Botswana than in South Africa (with the lower 
concentration of the two). However, Nigeria with the lowest concentration has slower 
adjustments than more concentrated South Africa and Zambia which quashes the possibility of a 
relationship. However, within Botswana there is an indication that bank concentration is 
negatively related to the speed of adjustment of deposit rates symmetrically and when they are 
above equilibrium (and the impulse is for them to fall). This relationship is identifiable in the 
three most concentrated periods where the reduction in concentration is associated with slower 
symmetric and negative adjustments of deposit rates. The relationship between the asymmetric 
response and the level of bank concentration is not observable as the asymmetric mean 
adjustment lags are not significant in the same periods for MAL+ and MAL- for both lending 
and deposit rates except in one period.   
The results for Nigeria, in Table D3, also show some signs of a relationship. As with Botswana 
there is a relationship but in this case it is a positive relationship in the deposit rate between 
decreasing bank concentration and a slower speed of adjustment in the least concentrated periods 
                                                            
50 See Section D of Appendix. 
51 If increasing bank concentration was associated with either larger or smaller MALs then it would be clear that a 
pattern/relationship is present between bank concentration and the speed of the IRPT, as represented by the MALs. 
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 for symmetric deposit rates while there is a negative relationship over the same period for falling 
concentration and the faster adjustment of increasing deposit rates. The symmetric and 
asymmetric response of lending rates in Nigeria is not related to the level of bank concentration.  
In Zambia bank concentration is negatively related to the symmetric and asymmetric mean 
adjustment lags for deposit rates in the most concentrated periods. As concentration fell the time 
taken for deposit rates to return to equilibrium increased i.e. the speed of adjustment fell. This is 
a similar relationship to the one identified in Botswana. However, as with Botswana, the 
relationship does not hold for all the periods and so cannot be described as a distinct relationship. 
In terms of the lending rates, as with the other countries in the study a clear relationship could 
not be identified. 
Where the Wald test was performed to determine whether MAL+ was truly different from MAL- 
the results suggested that there was asymmetry in the response of bank rates to impulses to rise 
or fall to equilibrium with official rates. As in the analysis for the entire period, the presence of 
asymmetry was not related to the level of banking sector concentration (see Tables D1 to D4 of 
the Appendix).  
The analysis of results identified traces of a relationship between bank concentration and the 
symmetric and negative adjustment of deposit rates and falling lending rates, and moves onto an 
investigation of the relationship between bank concentration and the magnitude of the adjustment 
of bank rates in the short and long run, symmetrically and asymmetrically in response to official 
rate changes. 
5.6 MAGNITUDE OF ADJUSTMENT 
The magnitude of adjustment refers to the size of the change in the bank lending and deposit 
rates following a change in Central Bank rates. The results, computed following the procedure 
laid out in Chapter 4, are presented below. 
5.6.1 Analysis for the entire period 
As presented in Table 5.4 below, the short run symmetric adjustment in deposit rates following a 
change in official rates is smallest in Nigeria where concentration is smallest. It is at its largest in 
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 South Africa where concentration is highest
52
. Based on this, the size of the short run adjustment 
of deposit rates is positively related to bank concentration. This is to say that the greater the 
concentration, the larger the size of the adjustment. However, the symmetric adjustment of 
lending rates does not show a similar pattern as the inclusion of Botswana (with the smallest 
adjustment) means that no clear relationship can be seen between concentration and the size of 
lending rate adjustments.  
TABLE 5.4 Cross-country comparison of CR3 conc. and magnitude adjustments 
Conc. Rank Conc. Level Country Period Bank Rate SR SR+ SR- LR LR+ LR- 
1 
0.91 BOTS 1994-2007 Deposit - - 0.374 0.3 0.271 0.923 
0.91 BOTS 1994-2007 Lending 0.36 0.295 0.446 0.98 0.773 0.797 
2 
0.88 RSA 1994-2007 Deposit 0.72 0.719 0.722 0.92 1.005 1.047 
0.88 RSA 1994-2007 Lending 0.826 0.806 0.852 0.98 1.101 0.949 
3 
0.71 ZAM 1994-2007 Deposit 0.716 0.733 0.699 0.86 0.837 0.923 
0.71 ZAM 1994-2007 Lending 0.985 0.771 0.714 0.92 1.1 0.954 
4 
0.67 NIG 1994-2007 Deposit 0.482 0.429 0.7 0.92 0.726 0.612 
0.67 NIG 1994-2007 Lending 0.701 - 0.989 0.99 0.465 1.088 
Only statistically significant parameters are reported here. Full tables are in the Appendix Tables E1 to E8. 
SR refers to the proportion of the policy rate change that is reflected in the bank rates in the short run,  
SR+ refers to the proportion of a positive policy rate change that is reflected in the bank rates in the short run,  
SR- refers to the proportion of a negative policy rate change that is reflected in the bank rates in the short run. 
LR refers to the proportion of the policy rate change that is reflected in the bank rates in the long run,  
LR+ refers to the proportion of a positive policy rate change that is reflected in the bank rates in the long run,  
LR- refers to the proportion of a negative policy rate change that is reflected in the bank rates in the long run. 
 
In-so-far-as the SR asymmetric response is concerned the Wald test confirms the presence of 
asymmetry in all the countries regardless of the level of concentration (see Tables F1 to F4 in 
Appendix).  
Table 5.4 also presents the long run symmetric and asymmetric magnitudes of adjustment. As 
can be seen, there is no clear pattern between concentration and the symmetric magnitude of 
adjustment of lending and deposit rates. In the case of lending rates, while Nigeria has the 
smallest long run adjustment and the lowest level of concentration, the largest adjustment is not 
associated with the most concentrated country (Botswana).   
The symmetric long run adjustment results are in line with the findings of the short run results 
where no clear pattern can be seen between bank concentration and either a rising or falling size 
                                                            
52 Botswana is eliminated from the analysis as it does not have a statistically significant value for the short run 
adjustment. This leaves South Africa as the most concentrated country in-so-far-as the symmetric short run 
adjustment is concerned. 
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 of adjustment following a positive or negative change in official rates. However, unlike the case 
of the short run adjustments, the Wald test shows that the response is only asymmetric for 
lending rates in Zambia and Nigeria and deposit rates in Zambia (countries with the lowest level 
of concentration). This indicates that asymmetry in the long run adjustment of bank rates may be 
related to the level of banking sector concentration. The rolling window analysis below should 
provide clearer evidence if this is in fact the case. 
5.6.2 Rolling Cointegration Analysis
53
 
In South Africa the symmetric adjustment of long run lending and deposit rates is negatively 
related to the level of banking sector concentration in the rolling windows from 1994-2001 to 
1999-2006 (lending rates) and 1995-2002 to 1999-2006 (deposit rates). Increasing concentration 
is associated with lower long run adjustments in bank rates following changes in official rates. 
This is in keeping with the SCP that suggests collusive behaviour will hinder the full reflection 
of changes in official rates in bank rates.  
In Botswana the only sign of a relationship between the symmetric long run adjustment and bank 
rate adjustment can be seen in lending rates in the rolling windows 1994-2001 to 1996-2003 
where falling concentration is associated with larger long run adjustments. This is a similar 
relationship to the one found in South Africa and it provides additional support for the influence 
of the SCP in so far as symmetric lending rate adjustments are concerned (see Table E6). As 
Table E7 shows, results on Nigeria do not give any evidence of a relationship between 
concentration and the symmetric adjustment of both lending and deposit rates. In contrast the 
evidence from Zambia (in Table E8) is similar to the findings in Botswana and South Africa 
where a relationship can be seen between falling concentration and larger symmetric magnitude 
of adjustments for lending rates. 
In-so-far-as the relationship between the level of concentration and the asymmetric response of 
the long run magnitude of adjustment is concerned, there is some evidence of a relationship with 
the positive long run adjustment and none with the negative long run adjustment. As Table E5 
shows, falling concentration is associated with larger long run adjustments in deposit rates 
                                                            
53 See Section E of Appendix. 
77
 following both increases (LR+) and decreases (LR-) in the official rate. The results for lending 
rates do not depict any relationship. 
In Botswana the only evidence of a relationship between the asymmetric adjustments and the 
level of concentration is in the lending rates. Over the sample period a falling level of bank 
concentration is associated with a larger long run positive adjustment in lending rates following a 
positive change in the official rate (see Table E6). In Nigeria there is evidence that both lending 
and deposit rates’ positive long run adjustments are related to the level of banking sector 
concentration. In the rolling windows 1996-2003 to 1999-2006 decreases in the level of 
concentration were associated with increases in the size of the positive long run adjustment of 
deposit rates while in the rolling windows 1994-2001 and 1995-2002 falling concentration is 
associated with a decreasing size in the positive long run adjustment of lending rates. In Zambia 
the positive long run adjustment of lending rates is positively related to the level of 
concentration. As the concentration level falls the size of the positive long run adjustment also 
falls. 
Of particular importance is that in all four countries whether the size of the negative adjustment 
is smaller or bigger than the corresponding positive adjustment for deposit and lending rates is 
not related to the level of banking sector concentration (see Tables E5 to E8).  
As to the question of whether the presence of asymmetry is contingent on bank concentration, 
there is no evidence that there is such a relationship as shown in the Wald test results in Tables 
E5 to E6 in the Appendix. These show evidence rejecting the null hypothesis of no asymmetry is 
weak and so in the majority of cases no asymmetry is found in the long run adjustments. Where 
asymmetry is found it is not contingent on the corresponding level of bank concentration. Put 
differently, the presence of asymmetry does not vary with the level of banking sector 
concentration. 
5.7 CONCLUSION 
This chapter provided evidence of relationships between bank concentration and the speed and 
magnitude of IRPT. While the relationships were not always distinct they were often confirmed 
in more than one country, giving the result greater credibility. What was clear though was that 
there was no evidence that asymmetry in the speed or magnitude of the IRPT was related to the 
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 level of bank concentration. However, despite presenting the results of the empirical analysis, 
this chapter did not provide the policy implications of those results as that analysis is reserved for 
Chapter 6. It did reveal an important fact that the conclusions that could be drawn from the 
analysis of the entire period for the four countries often contradicted the evidence from the 
rolling window analysis. For example, where the analysis of the entire period could not identify a 
relationship between bank concentration and the IRPT, the rolling window analysis did. This is 
possibly a reason for disagreement in the empirical evidence as the conclusion based on the two 
levels of analysis was sometimes different
54
.  
With the empirical results presented the next chapter presents the conclusions of this study, the 
policy implications of the results and areas for future study. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
54 This can be illustrated by Cottarelli and Kourellis (1994) who conduct and analysis of 63 countries and conclude 
that there is no relationship while studies like Corvoisier and Gropp (2002) do. 
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 CHAPTER 6:  
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS OF RESULTS, AND 
AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
6.1 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
This study set out to investigate the relationship between bank concentration and the IRPT in 
four African countries. Such an investigation in the African context was important not only 
because research in the area was scant by US and EU levels, but also because the review of 
theoretical and empirical literature did not arrive at a consensus on whether a relationship existed 
and, where one was found, what the nature of that relationship was.  Following the inconclusive 
results of the literature review the study set six key objectives. The first was to determine 
whether there was a relationship between bank concentration and the speed of the IRPT. The 
second was to determine whether a relationship could be found between bank concentration and 
the magnitude of the IRPT. The third and fourth objectives were to determine whether changes in 
the symmetric and asymmetric speed and magnitudes of the IRPT were related to the level of 
bank concentration. The fifth objective was to assess whether changes in bank concentration, 
over time, were related to the speed and magnitude of the IRPT. The final objective was to 
articulate the policy implications of the empirical results of the study. 
The theoretical literature review presented two competing theories on the possibility and nature 
of a relationship between bank concentration and the IRPT. The Structure Conduct Performance 
Hypothesis suggested increased bank concentration would lead to collusive bank behaviour and a 
weakening of the IRPT’s speed and magnitude. The Efficient Market Hypothesis, in contrast, 
suggested that increasing bank concentration arose from market efficiency and that any attempt 
by banks to retard the IRPT, by resisting monetary policy impulses, would be quickly quashed. 
In addition to this contention in the industrial organisation theory, some research suggested that 
no relationship actually existed between bank concentration and the IRPT and that any 
semblance of a relationship captured the relationship between banking sector competition and the 
IRPT. Furthermore, these researchers suggested that given that concentration and competition 
are not necessarily synonymous, the expectation that concentration would be related to the IRPT 
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 was questionable. The lack of clarity in the theoretical literature was compounded by empirical 
literature that similarly provided conflicting conclusions on whether a relationship existed.  
Given the lack of consensus in literature and the growth in mergers, acquisitions and 
consolidation exercises in the banking industries around the world (and in particular in Africa), 
this study was undertaken. Using Symmetric and Asymmetric Error Correction Models, Mean 
Adjustment Lags, Ordinary Least Squares estimations and Autoregressive Distributed Lag 
models, as described in Chapter 4, the study identified the following: 
Regarding the speed of adjustment, there is evidence that in some cases, bank concentration is 
related to the speed of the IRPT.  In the analysis of the entire period there is evidence of a 
negative relationship between bank concentration and speed of lending rate adjustments down to 
equilibrium suggesting that the greater the concentration, the slower the reduction in lending 
rates by banks following a change in official rates. Put differently, bank concentration can be 
seen to negatively impede expansionary monetary policy when lending rates are expected to fall.  
However, once the analysis is moved to the rolling windows, the trend over time suggests a 
relationship only in the adjustment of deposit rates.  In addition, where the trend over time shows 
a relationship between bank concentration and the symmetric and negative adjustment of deposit 
rates, the nature of the relationship is not consistent. In Botswana and Zambia the relationship is 
a negative one suggesting that greater bank concentration results in slower adjustments of 
deposit rates while in Nigeria it is a positive one suggesting that greater bank concentration is 
associated with faster adjustments in deposit rates. In addition the evidence from the Wald tests 
shows that bank concentration is not related to the presence of asymmetry in the speed of 
adjustment of both lending and deposit rates. This result is the same for the analysis of the entire 
period and the analysis through the rolling windows. 
In-so-far-as the magnitude of the adjustment is concerned, there is more evidence to suggest a 
relationship with bank concentration than there is to suggest a relationship between bank 
concentration and the speed of the IRPT. There is a positive relationship between the symmetric 
adjustment of deposit rates and the level of bank concentration in the analysis of the entire 
period. This analysis also shows a relationship between falling concentration and larger long run 
negative adjustments in lending rates which suggest that the responsiveness of banks to monetary 
policy impulses to reduce lending rates is negatively affected by bank concentration. In other 
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 words, bank concentration stifles the magnitude of the IRPT and by implication the effectiveness 
of monetary policy. In the rolling window analysis the evidence suggests a relationship with 
deposit rates as well. However, in some cases the relationships are positive while in others they 
are negative suggesting that there is no consistent relationship between bank concentration and 
the magnitude of the IRPT in both the short run and long run, symmetrically or asymmetrically. 
In some cases there is evidence that supports the Structure Conduct Performance hypothesis 
while in others there is evidence supporting the Efficient Market Hypothesis.  
It is important to note that the relationships were not consistent between the countries and across 
the two levels of analysis. This suggests that the relationships were either not the natural 
outcome of bank concentration and the IRPT (supporting researchers such as Van Leuvensteijn, 
et al, 2008) or that there are some mitigating factors that are preventing the observation of the 
relationship. While the true explanation may still be debated, what is clear in the evidence is that 
bank concentration is not consistently related to the speed and magnitude of the IRPT. As a 
result, while the results show that bank concentration can be negatively and positively related to 
the speed and magnitude of the IRPT it should not be expected that greater concentration will 
either automatically retard or accelerate the IRPT and make monetary policy transmission any 
more or any less effective. Additionally, the fact that the relationships observed between bank 
concentration and the IRPT cannot be captured neatly by one hypothesis suggests that the 
influence of bank concentration will not be universal but will capture the trend within a country 
at the time. Consequently, trying to identify a single relationship will continue to provide 
inconclusive results where the reality is that bank concentration can be related to the IRPT in 
different ways in different countries at different times. 
The fact that the monetary policy has generally been effective in the sample countries (see 
Chapter 3) seems to suggest that the question for effective monetary policy transmission should 
not be one of whether bank concentration is related to the IRPT but that given the relationship 
that is identified by researchers at the time, how policy rates can be set to ensure sufficient and 
timely reflection in lending and deposit rates to achieve effective monetary policy. 
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 6.2 POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF RESULTS  
The most important implication of these results is that the African trend towards bank 
consolidation (in line with the global trend noted earlier) is not to be immediately regarded with 
alarm in-so-far-as effective monetary policy is concerned. Simply because concentration is likely 
to increase is not to say that the IRPT will weaken or monetary policy will be less effective. 
Another important outcome of the study is that the analyses on different levels produced 
different results and these results were not mirrored by the simple trend analyses of Chapter 3. 
The analysis of the four countries for the entire period produced results that were contradicted by 
the rolling window analysis that captured the trend over time. This suggests an explanation for 
variations in empirical evidence as the investigation of the same data set in this study produced 
conflicting results. For this reason some caution is necessary in the interpretation of any 
empirical results on the analysis of the IRPT.    
It is important to note that this study is not a vindication of proponents of increased bank 
consolidation and concentration. Such a conclusion can only be informed in part by this study 
because there are still other concerns around the operation of highly concentrated markets, for 
example, the potential abuse of market power access to financial capital. 
As competition commissions consider legislation relating to policy on acceptable mergers, 
acquisitions and consolidation exercises in the banking industry they may now do so informed of 
the fact that the evidence in the selected African countries in this study is that the level of 
banking concentration can be, but is not always, related to the either the strength or weakness of 
the IRPT of policy changes to bank deposit and lending rates. 
6.3 AREAS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
This study’s greatest challenge was data availability. In the event that bank level data is obtained, 
it is possible that the results of a similar analysis may reveal that concentration is related to the 
IRPT only in specific products. In other words, bank concentration may be positively related to a 
slower IRPT of policy rate changes to corporate loans while a relationship may not be present for 
bank overdrafts. In this case simply concluding that the IRPT of policy rate changes to lending 
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 rate changes is not related to the level of bank concentration would ignore the product level 
differences. 
Additionally, the availability of firm level data on market shares for all banks in all years for all 
countries may allow the study to be repeated with different measures of concentration (like the 
HHI) to assess whether the conclusions reached are the result of the measure of concentration are 
a true reflection of the relationship between bank concentration and the speed and magnitude of 
the IRPT. 
Furthermore, this study did not explicitly investigate causality between bank concentration and 
the speed and magnitude of the IRPT but, rather, whether differences in bank concentration 
could help explain differences in the IRPT in four African countries. With more data points for 
bank concentration, causality could be investigated. For example, with the use of more frequent 
bank concentration data points rather than the annual ones available to this study, granger 
causality could be investigated by determining if changes in bank concentration actually precede 
the changes in the speed and magnitude of the IRPT. However, despite these limitations, the 
conclusions and observations made in this study are relevant for public policy consideration 
because they provide insight on an important issue surrounding bank market structure, monetary 
policy and, ultimately, economic performance. 
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Significance denoted at 1%, 5%, 10% by (*),(**),(***), respectively
Unless otherwise stated all tables and figures are calculated by the author from the data set. 
KPSS (H: 0 ~ Stationarity) Critical Values: 1% (0.739), 5% (0.463), 10% (0.347)
Level 1st Diff Level 1st Diff Level 1st Diff Level 1st Diff Level 1st Diff Level 1st Diff
1994-2001 -1.944 -4.724* 0.442* 0.212* -1.405 -6.349* 0.374* 0.260* -1.388 -5.951* 0.343* 0.278*
1995-2002 -2.011 -4.924* 0.738 0.117* -1.623 -6.671* 0.640* 0.126* -1.64 -6.299* 0.621* 0.621*
1996-2003 -1.676 -7.017* 0.875 0.095* -1.595 -4.361* 0.812 0.108* -1.048 -6.123* 0.834 0.118*
1997-2004 -1.392 -7.037* 0.913 0.050* -1.745 -4.156* 0.882 0.056* -1.235 -6.072* 0.939 0.055*
1998-2005 -1.557 -6.972* 0.848 0.053* -1.368 -4.437* 0.859 0.053* -1.458 -3.848* 0.927 0.051*
1999-2006 -2.541 -6.011* 0.851 0.323* -1.974 -3.231* 0.887 0.285* -1.965 -3.236** 0.982 0.266*
2000-2007 -1.304 -6.014* 0.463* 0.221* -2.206 -2.644* 0.582* 0.164* -2.177 -2.733*** 0.699* 0.170*
1994-2007 -1.883 -6.360* 1.047 0.110* -1.849 -5.862* 1.029 0.108* -1.421 -2.921** 1.058 0.107*
Level 1st Diff Level 1st Diff Level 1st Diff Level 1st Diff Level 1st Diff Level 1st Diff
1994-2001 -2.078 -7.294* 0.423* 0.252* -0.941 -10.079* 0.759 0.130* -1.474 -14.232* 0.366* 0.149*
1995-2002 -3.511* -14.929* 0.390* 0.219* 0.287 -8.187* 0.955 0.218* -0.552 -12.669* 0.711* 0.403*
1996-2003 -1.517 -9.124* 0.571* 0.103* -0.823 -8.563* 1.073 0.151* -1.041 -13.142* 1.083 0.115*
1997-2004 -1.649 -9.592* 0.719 0.077* -1.218 -8.919* 1.051 0.170* -1.397 -13.365* 1.066 0.127*
1998-2005 -1.659 -10.316* 0.549* 0.120* -2.547 -9.295* 0.846 0.407* -2.53 -13.544* 0.863 0.236*
1999-2006 -1.778 -10.258* 0.330* 0.275* -2.547 -9.585* 0.640* 0.212* -1.984 -14.028* 0.641* 0.086*
2000-2007 -1.28 -10.240* 0.774 0.214* -2.177 -8.924* 0.319* 0.129* -3.289** -13.960* 0.349* 0.060*
1994-2007 -1.924 -8.013* 0.713 0.313* -2.59*** -14.135* 1.417 0.129* -2.80*** -16.164* 0.807 0.083*
Level 1st Diff Level 1st Diff Level 1st Diff Level 1st Diff Level 1st Diff Level 1st Diff
1994-2001 -2.116 -4.860* 0.211* 0.179* 0.114 -11.464* 0.499* 0.593* -0.602 -4.081* 0.856 0.115*
1995-2002 -2.667 -5.464* 0.428* 0.089* -1.464 -9.591* 0.815 0.115* -1.317 -7.305* 0.911 0.078*
1996-2003 -1.882 -12.294* 0.631* 0.103* -1.466 -9.708* 0.739 0.165* -1.438 -7.972* 0.643* 0.133*
1997-2004 -1.924 -13.056* 0.753 0.099* -1.458 -9.977* 0.484* 0.211* -1.549 -7.972* 0.304* 0.145*
1998-2005 -1.601 -13.335* 0.256* 0.236* -1.36 -9.188* 0.299* 0.376* -1.292 -8.099* 0.295* 0.212*
1999-2006 -1.592 -13.312* 0.350* 0.100* -0.979 -8.469* 0.666* 0.324* -0.625 -7.316* 0.857 0.252*
2000-2007 -1.313 -13.805* 0.568* 0.086* -0.698 -9.015* 0.983 0.149* -0.627 -9.811* 0.999 0.104*
1994-2007 -2.403 -17.491* 0.424* 0.045* -2.113 -16.950* 0.547* 0.079* -1.96 -13.322* 0.379* 0.056*
Level 1st Diff Level 1st Diff Level 1st Diff Level 1st Diff Level 1st Diff Level 1st Diff
1994-2001 -1.098 -7.764* 0.365* 0.130* -2.036 -6.468* 0.457* 0.130* -1.942 -6.118* 0.469* 0.143*
1995-2002 -2.029 -4.782* 0.244* 0.155* -1.712 -6.511* 0.266* 0.161* -1.852 -5.932* 0.287* 0.147*
1996-2003 -1.454 -5.014* 0.624* 0.221* -2.206 -2.944* 0.499* 0.376* -2.177 -2.933*** 0.699* 0.133*
1997-2004 -2.515 -11.202* 0.843 0.232* -1.362 -10.410* 0.277* 0.190* -2.482 -12.024* 0.427* 0.296*
1998-2005 -1.814 -4.342* 0.775 0.081* -2.263 -12.165* 0.700* 0.071* -1.818 -9.224* 0.342* 0.087*
1999-2006 -2.968 -11.610* 0.629* 0.096* -2.541 -12.369* 0.537* 0.078* -2.148 -9.137* 0.254* 0.128*
2000-2007 -0.97 -10.842* 1.006 0.085* -3.507* -10.200* 0.189* 0.149* -2.239 -9.186* 0.696* 0.167*
1994-2007 -2.633 -8.235* 0.753 0.214* -2.315 -9.356* 0.450* 0.156* -2.147 -11.326* 0.452* 0.112*
KPSS
APPENDIX
KEY:  
ADF (H: 0 ~ Unit Root) Critical Values: 1% (-3.464643), 5% (-2.876515), 10% (-2.574831)
TABLE A1: RSA (Stationarity/Unit Root Test)
DEPOSIT RATE LENDING RATE POLICY RATE
ADF KPSS ADF KPSS ADF
SECTION A: STATIONARITY and UNIT ROOT TESTS
STATISTICAL AND MODEL FITTING RESULTS
TABLE A2 BOTSWANA (Stationarity/Unit Root Test)
DEPOSIT RATE LENDING RATE POLICY RATE
ADF KPSS ADF KPSS ADF KPSS
TABLE A3 NIGERIA (Stationarity/Unit Root Test)
DEPOSIT RATE LENDING RATE POLICY RATE
ADF KPSS ADF KPSS ADF KPSS
TABLE A4 ZAMBIA (Stationarity/Unit Root Test)
DEPOSIT RATE LENDING RATE POLICY RATE
ADF KPSS ADF KPSS ADF KPSS
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ADF McKinnon Critical values 2 variables ~ 100 observations: 1% (-4.008), 5% (-3.398), 10% (-0.3087) (Enders, 2004: 441)
ADF McKinnon Critical values 2 variables ~ 200 observations: 1% (-3.954), 5% (-3.368), 10% (-3.067) (Enders, 2004: 441)
Conc. Rank is the 3 firm concentration ratio ranking of rolling windows with 1 being the most concentrated and 7 the least concentrated.
TABLE B1 
ADF CRDW ECM coefficient ECM (prob).
Conc. Rank Dep. Variable
SOUTH AFRICA
7 1994-2001 Deposit Rate -2.594 0.586* -0.407 0.000
6 1995-2002 Deposit Rate -2.936 0.594* -0.497 0.000
5 1996-2003 Deposit Rate -4.339* 0.658* -0.379 0.000
4 1997-2004 Deposit Rate -4.883* 0.755* -0.399 0.000
2 1998-2005 Deposit Rate -5.187* 0.880* -0.392 0.000
1 1999-2006 Deposit Rate -3.309*** 0.444** -0.113 0.330
3 2000-2007 Deposit Rate -2.548 0.239 -0.055 0.569
1994-2007 Deposit Rate -3.443** 0.498** -0.361 0.000
7 1994-2001 Lending Rate -5.389* 0.952* -0.496 0.000
6 1995-2002 Lending Rate -5.198* 0.897* -0.581 0.000
5 1996-2003 Lending Rate -4.890* 0.811* -0.446 0.000
4 1997-2004 Lending Rate -4.891* 0.813* -0.505 0.000
2 1998-2005 Lending Rate -3.487** 0.802* -0.500 0.000
1 1999-2006 Lending Rate -2.061 0.402** 0.607 0.000
3 2000-2007 Lending Rate -1.745 0.101 -0.034 0.512
1994-2007 Lending Rate -4.744* 0.793* -0.435 0.000
TABLE B2 
ADF CRDW ECM coefficient ECM (prob).
Conc. Rank Dep. Variable
BOTSWANA
1 1994-2001 Deposit Rate -2.739 0.905* -0.408 0.000
2 1995-2002 Deposit Rate -5.48* 0.969* -0.351 0.000
3 1996-2003 Deposit Rate -2.647 0.281 -0.013 0.907
4 1997-2004 Deposit Rate -3.250 0.367*** -0.050 0.642
5 1998-2005 Deposit Rate -3.945** 0.503** -0.039 0.717
6 1999-2006 Deposit Rate -1.674 0.172 -0.082 0.432
7 2000-2007 Deposit Rate -1.284 0.106 -0.100 0.347
1994-2007 Deposit Rate -1.819 0.137 -0.347 0.000
1 1994-2001 Lending Rate -2.154 0.431** -0.239 0.004
2 1995-2002 Lending Rate -4.543* 0.558* -0.152 0.110
3 1996-2003 Lending Rate -9.353* 1.927* -0.257 0.026
4 1997-2004 Lending Rate -9.343* 1.925* 0.011 0.887
5 1998-2005 Lending Rate -9.415* 1.908* -0.267 0.014
6 1999-2006 Lending Rate -9.915* 1.768* -0.234 0.038
7 2000-2007 Lending Rate -8.965* 1.824* -0.505 0.000
1994-2007 Lending Rate -2.484 0.302 -0.353 0.000
 TABLE B3
ADF CRDW ECM coefficient ECM (prob).
Conc. Rank Dep. Variable
NIGERIA
1 1994-2001 Deposit Rate -2.132 0.214 -0.241 0.020
2 1995-2002 Deposit Rate -2.065 0.267 -0.308 0.005
3 1996-2003 Deposit Rate -2.402 0.376*** -0.330 0.002
4 1997-2004 Deposit Rate -2.471 0.427** -0.313 0.003
5 1998-2005 Deposit Rate -2.504 0.494** -0.443 0.000
6 1999-2006 Deposit Rate -2.589 0.501** -0.447 0.000
7 2000-2007 Deposit Rate -2.528 0.489** -0.428 0.000
1994-2007 Deposit Rate -3.4** 0.319 -0.392 0.000
1 1994-2001 Lending Rate -1.641 0.181 -0.134 0.049
2 1995-2002 Lending Rate -2.624 0.262 -0.146 0.119
3 1996-2003 Lending Rate -2.867 0.306 -0.158 0.100
4 1997-2004 Lending Rate -3.000 0.348 -0.156 0.108
5 1998-2005 Lending Rate -2.798 0.298 -0.084 0.451
6 1999-2006 Lending Rate -2.727 0.317 -0.073 0.420
7 2000-2007 Lending Rate -3.7** 0.368*** -0.043 0.623
1994-2007 Lending Rate -2.948 0.448** -0.400 0.000
SECTION B: COINTEGRATION ANALYSIS
Engle and Granger Model
CRDW critical values: 1% (0.511), 5% (0.386), 10% (0.322) (Gujarati, 1995: 726)
Engle and Granger Model
Engle and Granger Model
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 TABLE B4 
ADF CRDW ECM coefficient ECM (prob).
Conc. Rank Dep. Variable
ZAMBIA
1 1994-2001 Deposit Rate -2.383 0.248 -0.242 0.026
2 1995-2002 Deposit Rate -2.134 0.235 -0.305 0.004
3 1996-2003 Deposit Rate -3.865** 0.703* -0.563 0.000
4 1997-2004 Deposit Rate -2.578 0.578* -0.394 0.000
5 1998-2005 Deposit Rate -1.983    0.456** -0.437 0.000
6 1999-2006 Deposit Rate -1.981 0.465** -0.399 0.000
7 2000-2007 Deposit Rate -2.548 0.239 0.032 0.000
1994-2007 Deposit Rate -3.865** 0.483** -0.334 0.000
1 1994-2001 Lending Rate -2.636 0.489** -0.441 0.000
2 1995-2002 Lending Rate -3.4** 0.430** -0.435 0.000
3 1996-2003 Lending Rate -3.201* 0.374*** -0.353 0.000
4 1997-2004 Lending Rate -1.606 0.386** -0.344 0.002
5 1998-2005 Lending Rate -7.032* 1.377* -1.112 0.000
6 1999-2006 Lending Rate -5.823* 1.082* -0.537 0.000
7 2000-2007 Lending Rate -1.745 0.101 -0.911 0.000
1994-2007 Lending Rate -5.45* 0.920* -0.462 0.000
TABLE B5: CR3 Concentration vs. presence of cointegration in rolling windows
Conc. Rank Conc. Level Deposit Rate Lending Rate Country
1 0.97 Yes Yes BOTS
2 0.96 Yes Yes BOTS
3 0.94 No Yes BOTS
4 0.92 Yes Yes BOTS
5 0.89 Yes Yes BOTS
6 0.89 Yes Yes RSA
7 0.89 Yes Yes RSA
8 0.88 No No RSA
9 0.87 Yes Yes RSA
10 0.87 No Yes BOTS
11 0.86 Yes Yes RSA
12 0.84 No Yes BOTS
13 0.84 Yes Yes RSA
14 0.83 Yes Yes RSA
15 0.74 Yes Yes ZAM
16 0.71 Yes Yes ZAM
17 0.68 Yes Yes ZAM
18 0.66 Yes Yes ZAM
19 0.62 Yes Yes ZAM
20 0.61 Yes Yes ZAM
21 0.6 Yes Yes ZAM
22 0.5 Yes No NIG
23 0.45 Yes No NIG
24 0.41 Yes No NIG
25 0.4 Yes Yes NIG
26 0.4 Yes No NIG
27 0.4 Yes Yes NIG
28 0.4 Yes No NIG
Engle and Granger Model
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TABLE C1 
Conc. Rank Dep. Variable Constant Prob. ∆BR Prob. ECt-1 Prob. EC
+
t-1 Prob. EC
-
t-1 Prob.
SOUTH AFRICA
7 1994-2001 ∆Deposit Rate 0.000 0.996 0.782 0.000 -0.407 0.000
∆Deposit Rate -0.041 0.618 0.777 0.000 -0.325 0.037 -0.542 0.012
6 1995-2002 ∆Deposit Rate -0.017 0.767 0.759 0.000 -0.497 0.000
∆Deposit Rate -0.026 0.727 0.759 0.000 -0.473 0.007 -0.535 0.023
5 1996-2003 ∆Deposit Rate -0.045 0.439 0.759 0.000 -0.379 0.000
∆Deposit Rate -0.073 0.366 0.760 0.000 -0.319 0.049 -0.466 0.025
4 1997-2004 ∆Deposit Rate -0.071 0.221 0.767 0.000 -0.399 0.000
∆Deposit Rate -0.101 0.189 0.769 0.000 -0.328 0.042 -0.499 0.013
2 1998-2005 ∆Deposit Rate -0.055 0.343 0.779 0.000 -0.392 0.000
∆Deposit Rate -0.079 0.302 0.781 0.000 -0.336 0.039 -0.472 0.020
1 1999-2006 ∆Deposit Rate -0.013 0.690 0.613 0.000 -0.113 0.330
∆Deposit Rate 0.030 0.396 0.566 0.000 -0.285 0.293 0.174 0.311
1994-2007 ∆Deposit Rate 0.005 0.899 0.771 0.000 -0.361 0.000
∆Deposit Rate -0.010 0.839 0.772 0.000 -0.322 0.007 -0.419 0.006
7 1994-2001 ∆Lending Rate -0.033 0.480 0.741 0.000 -0.496 0.000
∆Lending Rate -0.182 0.001 0.682 0.000 0.294 0.166 -0.964 0.000
6 1995-2002 ∆Lending Rate -0.002 0.968 0.768 0.000 -0.581 0.000
∆Lending Rate -0.124 0.056 0.725 0.000 -0.023 0.926 -0.653 0.025
5 1996-2003 ∆Lending Rate -0.037 0.420 0.807 0.000 -0.446 0.000
∆Lending Rate -0.188 0.001 0.749 0.000 -0.347 0.115 -0.899 0.000
4 1997-2004 ∆Lending Rate -0.052 0.229 0.792 0.000 -0.505 0.000
∆Lending Rate -0.200 0.000 0.725 0.000 -0.514 0.040 -0.926 0.000
2 1998-2005 ∆Lending Rate -0.045 0.294 0.790 0.000 -0.500 0.000
∆Lending Rate -0.203 0.000 0.720 0.000 -0.558 0.029 -0.929 0.000
1 1999-2006 ∆Lending Rate -0.011 0.594 0.869 0.000 0.607 0.000
∆Lending Rate -0.006 0.825 0.866 0.000 -0.661 0.000 -0.542 0.008
1994-2007 ∆Lending Rate 0.000 0.997 0.820 0.000 -0.435 0.000
∆Lending Rate -0.093 0.004 0.790 0.000 0.206 0.196 -0.798 0.000
TABLE C2  
Conc. Rank Dep. Variable Constant Prob. ∆BR Prob. ECt-1 Prob. EC
+
t-1 Prob. EC
-
t-1 Prob.
BOTSWANA
1 1994-2001 ∆Deposit Rate -0.036 0.563 -0.136 0.456 -0.408 0.000
∆Deposit Rate 0.119 0.042 -0.044 0.775 -1.108 0.000 0.067 0.556
2 1995-2002 ∆Deposit Rate 0.001 0.978 0.070 0.653 -0.351 0.000
∆Deposit Rate 0.120 0.004 0.073 0.549 -1.181 0.000 0.069 0.444
4 1997-2004 ∆Deposit Rate 0.003 0.912 0.067 0.374 -0.050 0.642
∆Deposit Rate 0.022 0.446 0.066 0.375 -0.190 0.238 0.120 0.507
5 1998-2005 ∆Deposit Rate -0.005 0.850 0.063 0.422 -0.039 0.717
∆Deposit Rate 0.009 0.754 0.061 0.438 -0.145 0.389 0.069 0.683
1994-2007 ∆Deposit Rate -0.015 0.657 0.100 0.373 -0.347 0.000
∆Deposit Rate 0.093 0.156 0.144 0.007 -0.891 0.000 0.079 0.378
1 1994-2001 ∆Lending Rate 0.022 0.183 0.102 0.050 -0.239 0.004
∆Lending Rate 0.023 0.221 0.104 0.052 -0.260 0.073 -0.228 0.032
2 1995-2002 ∆Lending Rate 0.030 0.053 0.159 0.003 -0.152 0.110
∆Lending Rate 0.022 0.211 0.147 0.007 -0.063 0.648 -0.256 0.088
3 1996-2003 ∆Lending Rate 0.017 0.320 0.264 0.000 -0.257 0.026
∆Lending Rate 0.003 0.856 0.242 0.000 -0.107 0.477 -0.515 0.013
4 1997-2004 ∆Lending Rate 0.015 0.368 0.206 0.000 0.011 0.887
∆Lending Rate 0.007 0.689 0.219 0.000 -0.094 0.517 -0.459 0.018
5 1998-2005 ∆Lending Rate 0.030 0.058 0.245 0.000 -0.267 0.014
∆Lending Rate 0.017 0.332 0.225 0.000 -0.124 0.375 -0.526 0.009
6 1999-2006 ∆Lending Rate 0.026 0.069 0.278 0.000 -0.234 0.038
∆Lending Rate 0.025 0.121 0.276 0.000 -0.220 0.143 -0.256 0.211
7 2000-2007 ∆Lending Rate 0.005 0.667 0.388 0.000 -0.505 0.000
∆Lending Rate 0.000 0.984 0.384 0.000 -0.478 0.000 -0.606 0.018
1994-2007 ∆Lending Rate 0.013 0.339 0.413 0.000 -0.353 0.000
∆Lending Rate 0.006 0.704 0.408 0.000 -0.272 0.028 -0.414 0.000
Explanatory Variables
Explanatory Variables
∆BR is the change in the central bank/policy rate 
 The symmetric error correction coefficient is denoted by ECt-1  
 The asymmetric error correction coefficient representing adjustments down to equilibrium is denoted by EC
+
t-1
 The asymmetric error correction coefficient representing adjustments up to equilibrium is denoted by EC
-
t-1
∆Deposit Rate representes change in the deposit rate
∆Lending Rate represents change in the lending rate
SECTION C: ERROR CORRECTION RESULTS
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  TABLE C3
Conc. Rank Dep. Variable Constant Prob. ∆BR Prob. ECt-1 Prob. EC
+
t-1 Prob. EC
-
t-1 Prob.
NIGERIA
1 1994-2001 ∆Deposit Rate 0.029 0.791 0.027 0.037 -0.241 0.020
∆Deposit Rate 0.145 0.276 0.139 0.003 -0.489 0.011 -0.079 0.582
2 1995-2002 ∆Deposit Rate -0.032 0.788 0.138 0.003 -0.308 0.005
∆Deposit Rate 0.073 0.634 0.196 0.046 -0.481 0.014 -0.168 0.315
3 1996-2003 ∆Deposit Rate -0.026 0.840 0.039 0.001 -0.330 0.002
∆Deposit Rate 0.126 0.470 0.103 0.005 -0.518 0.004 -0.142 0.420
4 1997-2004 ∆Deposit Rate 0.005 0.967 0.035 0.009 -0.313 0.003
∆Deposit Rate 0.212 0.241 0.115 0.007 -0.551 0.002 -0.085 0.614
5 1998-2005 ∆Deposit Rate -0.004 0.976 0.093 0.051 -0.443 0.000
∆Deposit Rate 0.030 0.871 0.103 0.002 -0.477 0.008 -0.392 0.093
6 1999-2006 ∆Deposit Rate -0.036 0.771 0.053 0.008 -0.447 0.000
∆Deposit Rate -0.072 0.698 0.041 0.008 -0.412 0.017 -0.493 0.018
7 2000-2007 ∆Deposit Rate -0.021 0.860 0.025 0.043 -0.428 0.000
∆Deposit Rate -0.071 0.690 0.007 0.038 -0.378 0.024 -0.495 0.016
1994-2007 ∆Deposit Rate -0.015 0.872 0.459 0.000 -0.392 0.000
∆Deposit Rate 0.220 0.060 0.455 0.000 -0.726 0.000 -0.133 0.225
1 1994-2001 ∆Lending Rate 0.024 0.679 0.154 0.006 -0.134 0.049
∆Lending Rate 0.158 0.037 0.171 0.029 -0.589 0.001 0.002 0.984
7 2000-2007 ∆Lending Rate -0.048 0.463 0.056 0.043 -0.043 0.623
∆Lending Rate -0.041 0.647 0.055 0.001 -0.057 0.687 -0.028 0.853
1994-2007 ∆Lending Rate -0.002 0.986 0.707 0.000 -0.400 0.000
∆Lending Rate 0.096 0.374 0.706 0.000 -0.536 0.000 -0.252 0.037
  TABLE C4 
Conc. Rank Dep. Variable Constant Prob. ∆BR Prob. ECt-1 Prob. EC
+
t-1 Prob. EC
-
t-1 Prob.
ZAMBIA
1 1994-2001 ∆Deposit Rate 0.006 0.919 0.782 0.000 -0.404 0.000
∆Deposit Rate -0.030 0.709 0.777 0.000 -0.318 0.038 -0.529 0.012
2 1995-2002 ∆Deposit Rate -0.012 0.836 0.771 0.000 -0.403 0.000
∆Deposit Rate -0.054 0.485 0.768 0.000 -0.316 0.037 -0.548 0.009
3 1996-2003 ∆Deposit Rate -0.040 0.495 0.759 0.000 -0.374 0.000
∆Deposit Rate -0.066 0.413 0.760 0.000 -0.320 0.046 -0.459 0.030
4 1997-2004 ∆Deposit Rate -0.066 0.252 0.768 0.000 -0.396 0.000
∆Deposit Rate -0.096 0.212 0.769 0.000 -0.328 0.041 -0.497 0.016
5 1998-2005 ∆Deposit Rate -0.023 0.493 0.636 0.000 -0.135 0.204
∆Deposit Rate 0.006 0.912 0.623 0.000 -0.292 0.207 -0.039 0.814
6 1999-2006 ∆Deposit Rate -0.052 0.374 0.779 0.000 -0.390 0.001
∆Deposit Rate -0.075 0.325 0.781 0.000 -0.335 0.037 -0.472 0.022
7 2000-2007 ∆Deposit Rate 0.022 0.431 0.567 0.004 0.320 0.000
∆Deposit Rate 0.095 0.021 0.536 0.000 -0.391 0.060 0.385 0.037
1994-2007 ∆Deposit Rate -0.006 0.860 0.766 0.000 -0.334 0.000
∆Deposit Rate -0.014 0.754 0.766 0.000 -0.306 0.007 -0.369 0.009
1 1994-2001 ∆Lending Rate -0.035 0.458 0.749 0.000 -0.471 0.000
∆Lending Rate -0.187 0.001 0.696 0.000 0.317 0.148 -0.951 0.000
2 1995-2002 ∆Lending Rate -0.013 0.775 0.776 0.000 -0.435 0.000
∆Lending Rate -0.181 0.003 0.732 0.000 0.351 0.111 -0.928 0.000
3 1996-2003 ∆Lending Rate -0.037 0.417 0.813 0.000 -0.413 0.001
∆Lending Rate -0.201 0.001 0.759 0.000 0.389 0.084 -0.891 0.000
4 1997-2004 ∆Lending Rate -0.054 0.220 0.799 0.000 -0.474 0.000
∆Lending Rate -0.218 0.000 0.733 0.000 0.612 0.021 -0.920 0.000
5 1998-2005 ∆Lending Rate -0.046 0.286 0.797 0.000 -0.467 0.000
∆Lending Rate -0.225 0.000 0.728 0.000 0.678 0.013 -0.932 0.000
6 1999-2006 ∆Lending Rate -0.024 0.273 0.881 0.000 -0.328 0.000
∆Lending Rate 0.012 0.747 0.874 0.000 -0.602 0.015 -0.204 0.131
7 2000-2007 ∆Lending Rate -0.025 0.470 0.485 0.000 -0.911 0.000
∆Lending Rate -0.067 0.120 0.464 0.000 -0.724 0.000 -1.039 0.000
1994-2007 ∆Lending Rate -0.006 0.804 0.773 0.000 -0.462 0.000
∆Lending Rate -0.056 0.097 0.758 0.000 -0.169 0.269 -0.663 0.340
Explanatory Variables
Explanatory Variables
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Italicised lags are not statistically significant given the probability values or the sign of their corresponding error correction term’s coefficient. Additionally, only where both the coefficients
 EC+t-1  and  EC-t-1 lags are statistically significant do we apply the Wald test to determine if the resultant mean adjustment lags are truly different.
MAL: Symmetric Mean Adjustment Lag
MAL+: Mean Adjustment Lag when the bank rate is above its equilibrium with the official rate and the impulse is for bank rates to fall
MAL-: Mean Adjustment Lag when the bank rate is below its equilibrium with the official rate and the impulse is for bank rates to rise
TABLE D1 MAL MAL+ MAL- WALD TEST
Conc. Rank 
SOUTH AFRICA Dep. Variable F-stat Prob.
7 1994-2001 Deposit Rate 0.536 0.685 0.411 7.363 0
6 1995-2002 Deposit Rate 0.485 0.509 0.45 8.61 0
5 1996-2003 Deposit Rate 0.637 0.751 0.515 6.306 0.003
4 1997-2004 Deposit Rate 0.583 0.705 0.464 6.898 0.002
2 1998-2005 Deposit Rate 0.564 0.654 0.465 6.401 0.003
1 1999-2006 Deposit Rate 3.425 1.523 2.494 N/A N/A
1994-2007 Deposit Rate 0.633 0.708 0.545 10.358 0
7 1994-2001 Lending Rate 0.523 1.082 0.33 7.738 0.001
6 1995-2002 Lending Rate 0.399 12.041 0.422 8.321 0
5 1996-2003 Lending Rate 0.434 0.725 0.28 9.326 0.005
4 1997-2004 Lending Rate 0.412 0.535 0.298 7.152 0.001
2 1998-2005 Lending Rate 0.42 0.501 0.301 6.356 0.003
1 1999-2006 Lending Rate 0.215 0.203 0.248 13.215 0
1994-2007 Lending Rate 0.413 1.018 0.263 25.715 0
TABLE D2 MAL MAL+ MAL-
Conc. Rank
BOTSWANA Dep. Variable F-stat Prob.
1 1994-2001 Deposit Rate 2.786 0.942 15.619 N/A N/A
2 1995-2002 Deposit Rate 2.647 0.785 13.506 N/A N/A
4 1997-2004 Deposit Rate 18.554 4.908 7.79 N/A N/A
5 1998-2005 Deposit Rate 24.042 6.458 13.544 N/A N/A
1992-2007 Deposit Rate 2.594 0.961 10.861 37.88 0
1 1994-2001 Lending Rate 3.756 3.453 3.937 14.356 0
2 1995-2002 Lending Rate 5.52 13.571 3.331 N/A N/A
3 1996-2003 Lending Rate 2.868 7.108 1.471 N/A N/A
4 1997-2004 Lending Rate 74.947 8.284 1.702 N/A N/A
5 1998-2005 Lending Rate 2.832 6.238 1.473 N/A N/A
6 1999-2006 Lending Rate 3.088 3.283 2.823 N/A N/A
7 2000-2007 Lending Rate 1.211 1.289 1.017 12.3654 0
1992-2007 Lending Rate 1.665 2.175 1.428 11.48 0
TABLE D3 MAL MAL+ MAL-
Conc. Rank
NIGERIA Dep. Variable F-stat Prob.
1 1994-2001 Deposit Rate 4.042 1.76 10.826 N/A N/A
2 1995-2002 Deposit Rate 2.8 1.674 4.784 N/A N/A
3 1996-2003 Deposit Rate 2.913 1.73 6.298 N/A N/A
4 1997-2004 Deposit Rate 3.081 1.607 10.357 N/A N/A
5 1998-2005 Deposit Rate 2.049 1.882 2.286 N/A N/A
6 1999-2006 Deposit Rate 2.119 2.33 1.945 9.372 0
7 2000-2007 Deposit Rate 2.28 2.625 2.008 8.629 0
1992-2007 Deposit Rate 1.38 0.751 4.097 19.747 0
1 1994-2001 Lending Rate 6.31 1.408 515.111 N/A N/A
7 2000-2007 Lending Rate 21.814 16.465 33.91 N/A N/A
1992-2007 Lending Rate 0.732 0.548 1.168 15.784 0
TABLE D4 MAL MAL+ MAL-
Conc. Rank
ZAMBIA Dep. Variable F-stat Prob.
1 1994-2001 Deposit Rate 0.539 0.7 0.421 7.806 0.001
2 1995-2002 Deposit Rate 0.567 0.734 0.423 7.935 0.001
3 1996-2003 Deposit Rate 0.644 0.75 0.522 6.149 0.003
4 1997-2004 Deposit Rate 0.587 0.705 0.465 6.763 0.002
5 1998-2005 Deposit Rate 2.704 1.291 9.752 N/A N/A
6 1999-2006 Deposit Rate 0.566 0.653 0.464 8.256 0.003
7 2000-2007 Deposit Rate -13.369 1.185 1.204 N/A N/A
1992-2007 Deposit Rate 0.7 0.765 0.635 10.107 0
1 1994-2001 Lending Rate 0.533 0.959 0.319 N/A N/A
2 1995-2002 Lending Rate 0.515 0.763 0.288 N/A N/A
3 1996-2003 Lending Rate 0.452 0.619 0.27 N/A N/A
4 1997-2004 Lending Rate 0.425 0.435 0.29 6.326 0
5 1998-2005 Lending Rate 0.435 0.4 0.291 8.256 0
6 1999-2006 Lending Rate 0.363 0.208 0.615 9.365 0
7 2000-2007 Lending Rate 0.565 0.74 0.516 7.325 0
1992-2007 Lending Rate 0.492 1.431 0.366 N/A N/A
WALD TEST
WALD TEST
WALD TEST
SECTION D: MEAN ADJUSTMENT LAGS
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Table E1
Conc. Rank Dep.Variable Constant prob. SR (∆BR) prob. Constant prob. SR (∆BR)+ prob. SR (∆BR)- prob.
SOUTH AFRICA
7 1994-2001 Deposit Rate 0.006 0.929 0.737 0.000 -0.003 0.963 0.762 0.000 0.700 0.000
6 1995-2002 Deposit Rate -0.003 0.959 0.723 0.000 -0.011 0.878 0.742 0.000 0.692 0.000
5 1996-2003 Deposit Rate -0.019 0.757 0.714 0.000 -0.023 0.747 0.725 0.000 0.700 0.000
4 1997-2004 Deposit Rate -0.032 0.598 0.728 0.000 -0.046 0.504 0.771 0.000 0.682 0.000
2 1998-2005 Deposit Rate -0.013 0.828 0.740 0.000 -0.018 0.790 0.755 0.000 0.722 0.000
1 1999-2006 Deposit Rate -0.018 0.365 0.730 0.000 -0.050 0.568 0.748 0.000 0.739 0.000
3 2000-2007 Deposit Rate 0.010 0.717 0.586 0.000 0.013 0.686 0.567 0.000 0.596 0.000
1994-2007 Deposit Rate 0.005 0.904 0.720 0.000 0.005 0.906 0.719 0.000 0.722 0.000
7 1994-2001 Lending Rate -0.004 0.942 0.762 0.000 -0.002 0.969 0.757 0.000 0.768 0.000
6 1995-2002 Lending Rate 0.004 0.000 0.780 0.000 0.002 0.979 0.786 0.000 0.786 0.000
5 1996-2003 Lending Rate -0.013 0.783 0.819 0.000 -0.008 0.883 0.806 0.000 0.834 0.000
4 1997-2004 Lending Rate -0.016 0.722 0.810 0.000 -0.008 0.885 0.786 0.000 0.837 0.000
2 1998-2005 Lending Rate -0.015 0.733 0.807 0.000 -0.008 0.878 0.786 0.000 0.831 0.000
1 1999-2006 Lending Rate -0.014 0.557 0.833 0.000 -0.040 0.124 1.037 0.000 0.759 0.000
3 2000-2007 Lending Rate -0.001 0.939 0.902 0.000 -0.017 0.251 1.012 0.000 0.837 0.000
1994-2007 Lending Rate 0.987 0.000 0.826 0.000 0.006 0.849 0.806 0.000 0.852 0.000
Table E2
Conc. Rank Dep.Variable Constant prob. SR (∆BR) prob. Constant prob. SR (∆BR)+ prob. SR (∆BR)- prob.
BOTSWANA
1 1994-2001 Deposit Rate -0.037 0.586 -0.050 0.790 0.022 0.750 -0.519 0.053 0.425 0.114
2 1995-2002 Deposit Rate -0.016 0.779 -0.063 0.730 9.578 0.000 -0.207 0.517 0.193 0.584
3 1996-2003 Deposit Rate -0.003 0.902 0.064 0.319 0.001 0.971 0.036 0.697 0.098 0.321
4 1997-2004 Deposit Rate 0.003 0.823 0.064 0.385 0.007 0.773 0.029 0.782 0.104 0.350
5 1998-2005 Deposit Rate -0.006 0.792 0.062 0.427 -0.006 0.820 0.057 0.594 0.068 0.579
6 1999-2006 Deposit Rate 0.001 0.979 0.052 0.484 -0.001 0.953 0.071 0.492 0.029 0.799
7 2000-2007 Deposit Rate -0.007 0.752 0.042 0.563 -0.008 0.727 0.055 0.602 0.029 0.788
1992-2007 Deposit Rate -0.015 0.676 0.086 0.472 0.010 0.781 -0.131 0.414 0.374 0.046
1 1994-2001 Lending Rate 0.008 0.724 0.179 0.005 0.032 0.155 -0.016 0.852 0.376 0.000
2 1995-2002 Lending Rate 0.008 0.761 0.188 0.005 0.034 0.163 -0.017 0.894 0.395 0.000
3 1996-2003 Lending Rate 0.010 0.544 0.228 0.000 0.014 0.415 0.190 0.012 0.272 0.001
4 1997-2004 Lending Rate 0.010 0.544 0.228 0.000 0.014 0.415 0.190 0.012 0.272 0.000
5 1998-2005 Lending Rate 0.019 0.236 0.208 0.000 0.020 0.246 0.201 0.006 0.217 0.009
6 1999-2006 Lending Rate 0.018 0.206 0.239 0.000 0.015 0.299 0.262 0.000 0.211 0.004
7 2000-2007 Lending Rate 0.007 0.519 0.256 0.000 0.006 0.677 0.270 0.000 0.241 0.000
1992-2007 Lending Rate 0.014 0.339 0.360 0.000 0.021 0.160 0.295 0.000 0.446 0.000
Table E3
Conc. Rank Dep.Variable Constant prob. SR (∆BR) prob. Constant prob. SR (∆BR)+ prob. SR (∆BR)- prob.
NIGERIA
1 1994-2001 Deposit Rate -0.019 0.875 0.701 0.000 -0.004 0.968 0.780 0.004 0.833 0.000
2 1995-2002 Deposit Rate -0.014 0.789 0.739 0.000 -0.002 0.948 0.713 0.000 0.780 0.000
3 1996-2003 Deposit Rate -0.018 0.735 0.691 0.000 -0.007 0.929 0.714 0.000 0.656 0.000
4 1997-2004 Deposit Rate -0.031 0.579 0.678 0.000 -0.006 0.910 0.705 0.000 0.635 0.000
5 1998-2005 Deposit Rate -0.013 0.803 0.669 0.000 -0.037 0.891 0.680 0.000 0.657 0.000
6 1999-2006 Deposit Rate -0.025 0.456 0.683 0.000 -0.007 0.873 0.723 0.000 0.640 0.000
7 2000-2007 Deposit Rate 0.019 0.463 0.693 0.000 0.365 0.855 0.708 0.000 0.677 0.000
1992-2007 Deposit Rate -0.008 0.938 0.482 0.000 0.034 0.720 0.429 0.007 0.700 0.000
1 1994-2001 Lending Rate -0.046 0.571 1.036 0.000 0.104 0.130 0.128 0.342 1.177 0.000
2 1995-2002 Lending Rate -0.042 0.527 0.110 0.344 0.110 0.776 0.196 0.213 -0.008 0.968
3 1996-2003 Lending Rate -0.039 0.486 0.128 0.272 0.092 0.917 0.181 0.196 -0.007 0.893
4 1997-2004 Lending Rate -0.036 0.448 0.118 0.251 0.078 0.085 0.167 0.181 -0.007 0.824
5 1998-2005 Lending Rate -0.033 0.414 0.109 0.231 0.070 0.366 0.154 0.167 -0.006 0.760
6 1999-2006 Lending Rate -0.031 0.382 0.101 0.214 0.062 0.237 0.142 0.154 -0.006 0.701
7 2000-2007 Lending Rate -0.047 0.470 0.044 0.618 -0.073 0.293 0.204 0.253 -0.023 0.829
1992-2007 Lending Rate 0.008 0.000 0.701 0.000 0.147 0.099 -0.069 0.643 0.989 0.000
Explanatory Variables
Explanatory Variables
Explanatory Variables
SECTION E: SHORT RUN (SR) MAGNITUDE OF ADJUSTMENT
SR (∆BR) is the short run symmetric change in the  official /policy rate
SR (∆BR)+ is the short run asymmetric positive change  in the  official/policy rate 
SR (∆BR)- is the short run asymmetric negative change  in the  official/policy rate 
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Table E4
Conc. Rank Dep.Variable Constant prob. SR (∆BR) prob. Constant prob. SR (∆BR)+ prob. SR (∆BR)- prob.
ZAMBIA
1 1994-2001 Deposit Rate 0.006 0.929 0.737 0.000 -0.003 0.963 0.762 0.000 0.700 0.000
2 1995-2002 Deposit Rate -0.015 0.814 0.723 0.000 -0.026 0.716 0.752 0.000 0.677 0.000
3 1996-2003 Deposit Rate -0.019 0.757 0.714 0.000 -0.023 0.747 0.725 0.000 0.700 0.000
4 1997-2004 Deposit Rate -0.032 0.598 0.728 0.000 -0.046 0.504 0.771 0.000 0.682 0.000
5 1998-2005 Deposit Rate -0.013 0.828 0.740 0.000 -0.018 0.790 0.755 0.000 0.722 0.000
6 1999-2006 Deposit Rate -0.025 0.470 0.622 0.000 -0.021 0.591 0.589 0.000 0.633 0.000
7 2000-2007 Deposit Rate 0.019 0.477 0.573 0.000 0.022 0.474 0.555 0.000 0.583 0.000
1992-2007 Deposit Rate -0.010 0.780 0.716 0.000 -0.014 0.724 0.733 0.000 0.699 0.000
1 1994-2001 Lending Rate -0.004 0.942 0.762 0.000 -0.002 0.969 0.757 0.000 0.768 0.000
2 1995-2002 Lending Rate 0.004 0.939 0.780 0.000 0.001 0.979 0.786 0.000 0.771 0.000
3 1996-2003 Lending Rate -0.013 0.783 0.819 0.000 -0.008 0.883 0.806 0.000 0.834 0.000
4 1997-2004 Lending Rate -0.016 0.722 0.810 0.000 -0.008 0.885 0.786 0.000 0.837 0.000
5 1998-2005 Lending Rate -0.015 0.733 0.807 0.000 -0.008 0.878 0.786 0.000 0.831 0.000
6 1999-2006 Lending Rate -0.019 0.437 0.843 0.000 -0.044 0.098 1.042 0.000 0.771 0.000
7 2000-2007 Lending Rate 0.007 0.000 0.891 0.000 -0.009 0.440 1.002 0.000 0.826 0.000
1992-2007 Lending Rate -0.006 0.832 0.771 0.000 -0.019 0.534 0.825 0.000 0.714 0.000
Table E5
Conc. Rank Dep. Variable Constant prob. LR (BR) prob. Constant prob. LR (∆BR+) LR (∆BR-)
SOUTH AFRICA
7 1994-2001 Deposit Rate -1.412 0.002 0.983 0.000 0.007 1.222 0.935 0.931
6 1995-2002 Deposit Rate -1.462 0.001 0.984 0.000 0.037 0.583 0.953 0.970
5 1996-2003 Deposit Rate -1.401 0.000 0.973 0.000 0.004 0.831 1.013 1.009
4 1997-2004 Deposit Rate -0.909 0.001 0.931 0.000 0.052 0.597 1.104 1.085
2 1998-2005 Deposit Rate -0.435 0.041 0.887 0.000 0.014 0.774 1.114 1.082
1 1999-2006 Deposit Rate -0.428 0.000 0.864 0.000 0.046 0.727 1.171 1.096
3 2000-2007 Deposit Rate 0.217 0.563 0.908 - 0.083 0.531 1.005 1.047
1994-2007 Deposit Rate -0.389 0.046 0.916 0.000 0.021 0.590 0.925 0.850
7 1994-2001 Lending Rate 2.718 0.000 1.033 0.000 0.028 0.418 1.295 1.157
6 1995-2002 Lending Rate 2.881 0.000 1.024 0.000 -0.028 1.540 1.333 1.127
5 1996-2003 Lending Rate 3.097 0.000 1.010 0.000 0.042 0.431 1.252 1.115
4 1997-2004 Lending Rate 3.430 0.000 0.984 0.000 -0.072 1.125 1.240 1.147
2 1998-2005 Lending Rate 3.575 0.000 0.973 0.000 0.034 0.522 1.371 1.113
1 1999-2006 Lending Rate 3.690 0.000 0.964 0.000 -0.081 0.918 1.247 1.179
3 2000-2007 Lending Rate 0.004 0.842 1.018 - -0.071 0.584 1.337 1.094
1994-2007 Lending Rate 3.544 0.000 0.982 0.000 -0.033 0.245 1.101 0.949
Table E6
Conc. Rank Dep. Variable Constant prob. LR (BR) prob. Constant prob. LR (∆BR+) L (∆BR-)
BOTSWANA
1 1994-2001 Deposit Rate 4.038 0.003 0.417 0.000 0.019 0.595 0.703 0.699
2 1995-2002 Deposit Rate 2.621 0.002 0.516 0.000 -0.026 0.583 0.723 0.742
3 1996-2003 Deposit Rate 0.209 0.542 0.805 - -0.014 0.335 0.789 0.785
4 1997-2004 Deposit Rate -0.375 0.044 0.884 - 0.084 0.086 0.884 0.845
5 1998-2005 Deposit Rate 1.108 0.100 0.606 0.000 0.030 0.531 0.808 0.830
6 1999-2006 Deposit Rate 2.775 0.000 0.905 - -0.033 0.727 0.913 0.857
7 2000-2007 Deposit Rate 2.983 0.000 0.681 - 0.062 0.063 0.546 0.786
1992-2007 Deposit Rate 5.884 0.001 0.295 0.007 0.009 0.815 0.271 0.923
1 1994-2001 Lending Rate 4.099 0.000 0.788 0.000 0.078 0.079 1.008 0.820
2 1995-2002 Lending Rate 4.304 0.000 0.828 0.000 -0.040 0.351 0.987 0.845
3 1996-2003 Lending Rate 1.872 0.000 0.973 0.000 -0.039 0.504 0.917 0.818
4 1997-2004 Lending Rate 1.893 0.000 0.972 0.000 -0.051 0.675 0.912 0.856
5 1998-2005 Lending Rate 1.907 0.000 0.971 0.000 -0.041 0.149 1.196 0.816
6 1999-2006 Lending Rate 3.097 0.000 0.889 0.000 -0.050 0.439 0.981 0.903
7 2000-2007 Lending Rate 4.253 0.000 0.811 0.000 -0.005 0.660 0.625 0.586
1992-2007 Lending Rate 1.591 0.005 0.976 0.000 0.015 0.291 0.773 0.797
Explanatory Variables
SECTION E continued...: LONG RUN (LR) MAGNITUDE OF ADJUSTMENT
Explanatory Variables
Explanatory Variables
LR (BR) is the short run symmetric positive change  in the  official/policy rate
LR (∆BR+) is the short run asymmetric positive change  in the  official/policy rate
LR (∆BR-) is the short run asymmetric negative change  in the  official/policy rate
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Table E7
Conc. Rank Dep. Variable Constant prob. LR (BR) prob. Constant prob. LR (∆BR+) L (∆BR-)
NIGERIA
1 1994-2001 Deposit Rate 3.519 0.030 0.567 0.000 0.017 0.531 0.628 0.624
2 1995-2002 Deposit Rate 5.666 0.001 0.669 - 0.074 0.520 0.645 0.663
3 1996-2003 Deposit Rate 7.506 0.000 0.719 - 0.021 0.299 0.705 0.701
4 1997-2004 Deposit Rate 6.795 0.000 0.817 - 0.026 0.814 0.801 0.796
5 1998-2005 Deposit Rate 3.947 0.000 0.860 - -0.036 0.798 0.880 0.802
6 1999-2006 Deposit Rate 4.145 0.652 0.874 - -0.020 0.459 0.902 0.807
7 2000-2007 Deposit Rate 1.803 0.257 0.849 - 0.115 0.117 0.887 0.772
1992-2007 Deposit Rate -0.016 0.983 0.856 0.000 -0.037 0.732 0.726 0.612
1 1994-2001 Lending Rate 12.874 0.000 0.484 0.000 -0.041 0.538 0.978 0.873
2 1995-2002 Lending Rate 1.532 0.004 0.965 - -0.054 0.720 0.973 0.913
3 1996-2003 Lending Rate -2.356 0.562 1.098 - -0.043 0.159 1.276 0.871
4 1997-2004 Lending Rate -4.236 0.356 1.028 - -0.053 0.468 1.046 0.964
5 1998-2005 Lending Rate -3.365 0.432 0.932 - -0.005 0.704 0.987 0.835
6 1999-2006 Lending Rate -3.890 0.000 1.025 - -0.035 0.168 1.074 0.931
7 2000-2007 Lending Rate 8.166 0.000 0.796 0.000 -0.089 0.457 0.687 0.997
1992-2007 Lending Rate 6.612 0.000 0.917 0.000 0.135 0.139 0.465 1.088
Table E8
Conc. Rank Dep. Variable Constant prob. LR (BR) prob. Constant prob. LR (∆BR+) L (∆BR-)
ZAMBIA
1 1994-2001 Deposit Rate -1.412 0.002 0.983 0.000 0.021 0.650 0.984 0.956
2 1995-2002 Deposit Rate -1.462 0.000 0.984 0.000 -0.028 0.637 0.790 0.811
3 1996-2003 Deposit Rate -1.401 0.001 0.973 0.000 -0.016 0.366 0.974 0.897
4 1997-2004 Deposit Rate -0.909 0.001 0.931 0.000 0.092 0.094 0.966 0.924
5 1998-2005 Deposit Rate -0.435 0.041 0.887 0.000 0.033 0.581 0.883 0.907
6 1999-2006 Deposit Rate 0.568 0.005 0.796 0.000 -0.036 0.795 0.998 0.937
7 2000-2007 Deposit Rate 0.865 0.017 0.776 0.000 0.068 0.069 0.597 0.859
1992-2007 Deposit Rate -0.431 0.024 0.921 0.000 0.019 0.598 0.837 0.923
1 1994-2001 Lending Rate 2.718 0.000 1.033 0.000 0.085 0.086 1.102 0.897
2 1995-2002 Lending Rate 2.881 0.000 1.024 0.000 -0.043 0.384 1.079 0.923
3 1996-2003 Lending Rate 3.097 0.000 1.010 0.000 -0.043 0.551 1.002 0.894
4 1997-2004 Lending Rate 3.430 0.000 0.984 0.000 -0.055 0.738 0.997 0.936
5 1998-2005 Lending Rate 3.575 0.000 0.973 0.000 -0.044 0.163 1.307 0.892
6 1999-2006 Lending Rate 3.690 0.000 0.964 0.000 -0.054 0.480 1.072 0.988
7 2000-2007 Lending Rate 4.046 0.507 0.926 0.000 -0.006 0.721 1.012 0.856
1992-2007 Lending Rate 3.525 0.000 0.985 0.000 -0.036 0.172 1.100 0.954
Explanatory Variables
Explanatory Variables
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SR is the short run 
LR is the long run
Table F1
Conc. Rank 
SOUTH AFRICA F-stat Prob. F-stat Prob.
7 1994-2001 Deposit Rate 15.178 0.000 1.237 0.112
6 1995-2002 Deposit Rate 28.995 0.000 3.266 0.365
5 1996-2003 Deposit Rate 22.168 0.000 3.657 0.127
4 1997-2004 Deposit Rate 14.457 0.000 2.169 0.958
2 1998-2005 Deposit Rate 24.429 0.000 9.327 0.070
1 1999-2006 Deposit Rate 41.870 0.000 4.366 0.668
3 2000-2007 Deposit Rate 0.457 0.366 0.316 0.370
1994-2007 Deposit Rate 52.203 0.000 9.264 0.095
7 1994-2001 Lending Rate 14.501 0.000 15.366 0.040
6 1995-2002 Lending Rate 65.178 0.000 4.366 0.090
5 1996-2003 Lending Rate 75.620 0.000 8.366 0.457
4 1997-2004 Lending Rate 59.572 0.000 5.368 0.126
2 1998-2005 Lending Rate 45.716 0.000 7.366 0.357
1 1999-2006 Lending Rate 8.427 0.000 9.366 0.057
3 2000-2007 Lending Rate 0.146 0.841 0.569 0.889
1994-2007 Lending Rate 123.735 0.000 7.366 0.060
Table F2
Conc. Rank SR LR
BOTSWANA F-stat Prob. F-stat Prob.
1 1994-2001 Deposit Rate 7.082 0.000 2.895 0.216
2 1995-2002 Deposit Rate 9.237 0.000 8.031 0.012
3 1996-2003 Deposit Rate 3.654 0.652 0.376 0.950
4 1997-2004 Deposit Rate 12.048 0.000 0.981 0.887
5 1998-2005 Deposit Rate 15.715 0.000 2.193 0.654
6 1999-2006 Deposit Rate 4.365 0.569 0.612 0.889
7 2000-2007 Deposit Rate 5.365 0.126 0.419 0.887
1992-2007 Deposit Rate 20.498 0.000 1.092 0.625
1 1994-2001 Lending Rate 15.499 0.000 2.259 0.354
2 1995-2002 Lending Rate 10.108 0.000 0.013 0.890
3 1996-2003 Lending Rate 6.592 0.000 4.859 0.120
4 1997-2004 Lending Rate 8.299 0.000 7.114 0.045
5 1998-2005 Lending Rate 9.413 0.000 1.386 0.892
6 1999-2006 Lending Rate 10.139 0.000 0.982 0.945
7 2000-2007 Lending Rate 10.612 0.000 0.013 0.954
1992-2007 Lending Rate 10.921 0.000 4.859 0.136
Table F3
Conc. Rank SR LR
NIGERIA F-stat Prob. F-stat Prob.
1 1994-2001 Deposit Rate 19.374 0.000 5.696 0.112
2 1995-2002 Deposit Rate 12.635 0.000 10.833 0.000
3 1996-2003 Deposit Rate 8.240 0.000 3.176 0.124
4 1997-2004 Deposit Rate 10.374 0.000 1.818 0.123
5 1998-2005 Deposit Rate 11.766 0.000 0.606 0.137
6 1999-2006 Deposit Rate 12.673 0.009 2.188 0.167
7 2000-2007 Deposit Rate 13.265 0.001 3.219 0.366
1992-2007 Deposit Rate 13.651 0.000 3.892 0.357
1 1994-2001 Lending Rate 7.365 0.000 0.540 0.156
2 1995-2002 Lending Rate 4.256 0.356 2.813 0.366
3 1996-2003 Lending Rate 3.257 0.257 7.660 0.046
4 1997-2004 Lending Rate 4.366 0.660 9.916 0.037
5 1998-2005 Lending Rate 4.365 0.366 4.186 0.669
6 1999-2006 Lending Rate 4.365 0.146 1.817 0.369
7 2000-2007 Lending Rate 16.582 0.008 2.813 0.156
1992-2007 Lending Rate 15.567 0.007 7.660 0.000
SR LR
SECTION F: WALD TEST SR AND LR MAGNITUDE OF ADJUSTMENT
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Table F4
Conc. Rank SR LR
ZAMBIA F-stat Prob. F-stat Prob.
1 1994-2001 Deposit Rate 16.878 0.000 1.475 0.924
2 1995-2002 Deposit Rate 22.015 0.000 1.737 0.845
3 1996-2003 Deposit Rate 14.358 0.000 4.548 0.365
4 1997-2004 Deposit Rate 9.364 0.000 8.215 0.065
5 1998-2005 Deposit Rate 11.788 0.000 12.998 0.036
6 1999-2006 Deposit Rate 13.370 0.006 6.165 0.089
7 2000-2007 Deposit Rate 14.401 0.000 4.383 0.126
1992-2007 Deposit Rate 15.074 0.000 7.999 0.047
1 1994-2001 Lending Rate 10.642 0.045 0.799 0.924
2 1995-2002 Lending Rate 8.369 0.000 1.913 0.854
3 1996-2003 Lending Rate 18.842 0.000 2.639 0.755
4 1997-2004 Lending Rate 21.098 0.000 3.112 0.652
5 1998-2005 Lending Rate 15.368 0.000 3.421 0.685
6 1999-2006 Lending Rate 9.365 0.000 7.500 0.027
7 2000-2007 Lending Rate 7.365 0.000 11.250 0.012
1992-2007 Lending Rate 18.596 0.041 8.365 0.024
100
Table H1 CR3
Period Conc. Level Conc. Rank Conc. Level Conc. Rank Conc. Level Conc. Rank Conc. Level Conc. Rank
1994-2001 0.82997 7 0.96702 1 0.49582 1 0.74408 1
1995-2002 0.83617 6 0.95926 2 0.44532 2 0.70881 2
1996-2003 0.86107 5 0.94289 3 0.41283 3 0.68047 3
1997-2004 0.87434 4 0.91888 4 0.40161 4 0.65875 4
1998-2005 0.88949 2 0.89482 5 0.40032 5 0.62463 5
1999-2006 0.89341 1 0.87105 6 0.40248 6 0.61076 6
2000-2007 0.88331 3 0.84487 7 0.40133 7 0.59941 7
BOTSWANA NIGERIA ZAMBIARSA
SECTION G: ROLLING WINDOW CONCENTRATION LEVELS 
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Adapted from a New Database on Financial Development Structure 2007 (World Bank, 2009).  
SECTION H: BANK CONCENTRATION AND NET INTEREST MARGIN
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RSARATE is the policy rate BOBRATE is the policy rate
BANKDISCOUNT is the policy rate DISCOUNTRATE is the policy rate
SECTION I: THE TREND OF POLICY, LENDING AND DEPOSIT RATES
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